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INTRODUCTION
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, employers have an
obligation to provide a work environment “free from recognized hazards that
are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm.”1 According
to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”), COVID19 falls within the scope of this law, and requires employers to take
affirmative steps to reduce COVID-19-related hazards in the workplace.2
Contact tracing technologies, the focus of this Article, are one way for
employers to meet this legal obligation.3
Before COVID-19 upended American businesses in 2020, employers
were tracking employee movements through technologies like Global

1. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (2018); see also Carrie Hoffman & John L. Litchfield, Employer Use of
Contact Tracing Apps: The Good, the Bad, and the Regulatory, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (July 7,
2020), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2020/07/employer-use-of-contact-tracingapps. The Occupational Safety and Health Act applies to “a person engaged in a business affecting
commerce who has employees, but does not include the United States (not including the United
States Postal Service) or any State or political subdivision of a State.” 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (2018).
Similar state laws apply to public employers. See, e.g., Washington v. Union Carbide Corp., 870
F.2d 957, 962–64 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that West Virginia’s Occupational Safety and Health Act
applies to public employers, as stated in W. VA. CODE §§ 21-3A-2(d)); Griffin v. Mullinix, 947
P.2d 177, 179 (Okla. 1997) (stating that Oklahoma’s Occupational Safety & Health Standards Act
applies only to public employers).
2. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OSHA 3990-03,
GUIDANCE ON PREPARING WORKPLACES FOR COVID-19, at 17 (2020); see also Hoffman &
Litchfield, supra note 1.
3. See generally Hoffman & Litchfield, supra note 1. See also Konrad Putzier & Chip Cutter,
Welcome Back to the Office. Your Every Move Will Be Watched, WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/lockdown-reopen-office-coronavirus-privacy-11588689725
(describing apps developed for contact tracing purposes). Contact tracing apps are not the only
means of protecting employees from the virus. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,
supra note 2, at 8–16 (setting forth numerous infection prevention measures for employers,
including the promotion of frequent hand washing, encouraging workers to stay home if they are
sick, establishing flexible work sites and work hours, routine disinfecting of surfaces, and many
others).
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Positioning System (“GPS”) and smartphone apps.4 The COVID-19
pandemic has rapidly accelerated the development and use of employee
surveillance technologies,5 with “some employers planning to track
movements and gather personal information like never before in Western
democracies.”6 This increase in employee surveillance is significant given
the present uncertainty regarding the COVID-19 pandemic’s expected
duration.7 In addition, tracking and contact tracing technologies will likely
continue to be used by employers after the pandemic and may become more
4. See generally Reid Blackman, How to Monitor Your Employees–While Respecting Their
Privacy, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 28, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/05/how-to-monitor-youremployees-while-respecting-their-privacy (reporting that “[e]ven before Covid-19 . . . employers
were ramping up their efforts to monitor employee productivity”); Susan Bassford Wilson, Tracking
Employees in the Age of COVID-19, CONSTANGY, BROOKS, SMITH & PROPHETE, LLP (July 1,
2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/tracking-employees-in-the-age-of-covid-19854/
(noting that “[c]ompanies have long debated the merits of video surveillance in the workplace,
tracking employee vehicles with GPS, or monitoring employee movements via a smartphone
application”). Before COVID-19, employers used GPS tracking devices to track workers’ locations.
See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Future Work, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 928 (2020).
5. News articles outlining the recent increase in employee location tracking and contact
tracing abound. See, e.g., Peter Grant, Office App Makers Cashing in on Pandemic Safety Needs,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/office-app-makers-cashing-in-onpandemic-safety-needs-11615294802 (reporting that “[i]nvestors are pouring money into phone
apps that enable companies to monitor employees’ movements and ensure they are complying with
social distancing . . . protocols”); Putzier & Cutter, supra note 3 (reporting that “[m]any Americans
heading back to the factory and the office as the coronavirus pandemic eases will soon begin to
notice that their every move is being watched or recorded”); Blackman, supra note 4 (reporting that
“[t]he fear of productivity losses [caused by the pandemic], mingling with the horror of massively
declining revenues, has encouraged many [business] leaders to ramp up their employee monitoring
efforts”); Ryan Browne, The Gadgets and Software that Could Help Us Return to the Office, CNBC
(Aug. 3, 2020, 6:23 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/03/the-gadgets-and-software-that-couldhelp-us-return-to-the-office.html (reporting that, in response to COVID-19, “[t]ech firms big and
small have been developing everything from wearable devices to thermal imaging cameras to help
businesses equip their office spaces for the future”); PUB. CITIZEN, WORKPLACE PRIVACY AFTER
COVID-19, at 4 (2020), https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/Workplace-Privacy-afterCovid-19-final.pdf (reporting that “[f]ifty new apps and technologies have been released since the
pandemic began, not accounting for existing, unchanged technologies that now are being marketed
as workplace surveillance tools to combat COVID-19”); Dan Schawbel, How Covid-19 Has
Accelerated the Use of Employee Monitoring, LINKEDIN (Aug. 17, 2020),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-covid-19-has-accelerated-use-employee-monitoring-danschawbel/ (noting that “[c]ompanies have invested more in technology during the pandemic” to
improve efficiencies, and “[w]hile 30 percent of companies monitored their employees back in
2015, it’s estimated that an entire 80 percent of companies are doing so today”); Wilson, supra note
4 (stating that although employers have monitored employees in the past, “some employers are
taking another look at employee monitoring as a means to help ensure employee safety and hinder
the spread of COVID-19”).
6. Putzier & Cutter, supra note 3.
7. See Daniela Hernandez & Drew Hinshaw, As Covid-19 Vaccines Raise Hope, Cold Reality
Dawns that Illness Is Likely Here to Stay, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-vaccines-raise-hope-cold-reality-dawns-covid-19-is-likely-hereto-stay-11612693803 (reporting that the COVID-19 virus might last for several years, if not
indefinitely, like the flu).
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technologically sophisticated, making it imperative to examine the legality
of such surveillance.8
Focusing on public employers, this Article examines how the most
commonly used contact tracing technologies impact the Fourth Amendment
rights of employees.9 More specifically, this Article examines whether
employer use of contact tracing technologies amounts to a Fourth
Amendment search or seizure, whether the workplace exception to the
warrant requirement would permit contact tracing programs, and which
specific technologies are most likely to be upheld as reasonable under
relevant Fourth Amendment precedents.10
Although this Article’s conclusions and proposals are outlined with
greater specificity below, briefly stated, this Article concludes that the least
invasive tracing technologies are contact tracing cell phone apps and
wearable contact tracing devices provided by employers, which generally
rely on Bluetooth rather than GPS technology.11 For those technologies, in
particular, this Article concludes that the Fourth Amendment is likely not
implicated because an employer’s use of such technologies would not
constitute a Fourth Amendment search or seizure of the employees

8. See Will Knight, Tech Could Be Used to Track Employees–in the Name of Health, WIRED
(May 17, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/tech-used-track-employees-name-health/
(reporting that Ryan Calo, a professor at the University of Washington, warns that new surveillance
measures used by employers may persist long after the pandemic); Putzier & Cutter, supra note 3
(quoting New York University professor of clinical law, Jason M. Schultz, as stating that
“[e]mployers don’t really have any incentives to remove surveillance once they install it”); id.
(describing a social-distancing app developed by real-estate company, RXR, which plans to use the
technology after the pandemic to ensure the most efficient use of space and “the overall wellness of
our customers”); Hirsch, supra note 4, at 928 (stating that “past advances like the time clock and
aptitude tests pale in comparison to what is already occurring now, which in turn is a far cry from
what is on the horizon”).
9. This Article is limited to public employers in the United States and to the Fourth
Amendment implications of contact tracing by those employers. This Article does not address other
potential legal issues involving contact tracing apps, including, for example, issues that might arise
under the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Stephen R. Brown et al., May an Employer Require
the Use of a Contact Tracing App?, WESTLAW J. CORP. OFFICERS & DIRECTORS LIAB., June 2020,
at 1 (2020); see also Mark Barnes et al., Going Back to Work: Employer Use of “Apps” on Employee
PDAs/Smart Phones for COVID-19 Contact Tracing, ROPES & GRAY (May 1, 2020),
https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2020/05/Going-Back-to-Work-Employer-Use-ofApps-on-Employee-PDAs-Smart-Phones-for-COVID-19-Contact-Tracing (discussing various
laws that may impact employer-based contact tracing); U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n,
What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO
Laws, https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitationact-and-other-eeo-laws (Dec. 14, 2021); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-NVTA2009-3, PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS IN THE WORKPLACE AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pandemic-preparedness-workplace-and-americansdisabilities-act#20 (2020).
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Section I.B.2 and I.C.
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themselves, their devices, or their data.12 Nevertheless, there may be
instances where the Fourth Amendment is implicated by these technologies.
For example, if an employee is compelled by her employer to don a wearable
tracking device, such as a wearable GPS-enabled necklace, this would likely
constitute a Fourth Amendment search under the physical trespass test
espoused in United States v. Jones.13 In that event, a court would have to
determine whether the search is reasonable under relevant Fourth
Amendment precedents.14
Assuming a search or seizure would occur, this Article concludes that
an employer’s use of contact tracing cell phone apps and wearable contact
tracing devices falls within the scope of the workplace exception to the
warrant requirement set forth in O’Connor v. Ortega.15 Under that exception,
this Article further concludes that employer use of these contact tracing
technologies would be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.16 This is
because such devices advance the legitimate and substantial employer
purpose of minimizing COVID-19 infections amongst employees.
Additionally, the degree of intrusion upon employees is minimal since no
employee cell phone data is accessed and detailed location information is not
gathered like it is with GPS tracking, and the scope of surveillance is
reasonable given that these technologies do not track anyone’s location
outside of work.17
Before turning to that analysis, Part I of this Article summarizes the
technologies that enable employers to track employee movements, including
those developed in response to COVID-19. Part II then outlines the Fourth
Amendment rights of public employers. Next, Part III summarizes key
judicial rulings on employer-initiated GPS tracking, a precursor to more
modern contact tracing methods, and highlights lessons learned from Fourth
Amendment litigation in this area. With those lessons in mind, Part IV
identifies and analyzes a series of employment-related Fourth Amendment
issues raised by more recent forms of contact tracing, with a particular focus
on the most commonly used tracing technologies: contact tracing apps and
wearable contact tracing devices. Finally, Part V provides proposals for
contact tracing by public employers.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See infra Section IV.B.
565 U.S. 400 (2012); see infra notes 299–304 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 118–122 and accompanying text.
480 U.S. 709 (1987); see also infra Section IV.C.1.
See infra Section IV.C.2–3.
See infra Section IV.C.2–3.
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I. EMPLOYEE LOCATION TRACKING DEVICES AND TECHNOLOGIES
Before analyzing the lawfulness of contact tracing, this Part outlines
various technologies that enable employers to track or trace the movements
of employees. Technologies summarized in this Part include GPS devices
installed in employee vehicles, smartphone apps specifically designed to
combat COVID-19, wearable location monitoring devices, video monitoring
of employees, and a host of cutting-edge technologies that could be
repurposed for contact tracing purposes, including radio-frequency
identification (“RFID”) chips implanted in employees.
A. GPS Tracking of Employee Vehicles
Perhaps the most established form of employee location tracking is
through GPS tracking devices that track employee vehicles. This tracking
method has been used to track employer-owned and personally-owned
vehicles. Moreover, employers have implemented this surveillance method
with and without employee knowledge and consent, both in employee
misconduct investigations and outside the investigative context.18
Employers have generally tracked employees with GPS devices in one
of two ways. The first method involves employers surreptitiously installing
a GPS tracking device on an employee’s vehicle, without the employee’s
knowledge or consent, to investigate an individual employee as part of a
workplace misconduct investigation.19 The second method involves
employers installing GPS tracking devices in an entire fleet of employee
vehicles, often with employee knowledge and consent, for some
noninvestigatory business-related purpose, such as to improve efficiency or
collect regulatory information.20 These forms of GPS tracking, including
how legal challenges to these methods might impact the employee tracing
methods used to combat COVID-19, are examined in Part III.

18. See generally Marc Chase McAllister, GPS and Cell Phone Tracking of Employees, 70 FLA.
L. REV. 1265, 1293–310 (2019).
19. See, e.g., Cunningham v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Lab. (Cunningham II), 997 N.E.2d 468 (N.Y.
2013) (involving an employer’s surreptitious GPS tracking of its employee’s private vehicle); Elgin
v. St. Louis Coca-Cola Bottling Co., No. 4:05CV970-DJS, 2005 WL 3050633 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 14,
2005) (involving an employer’s surreptitious GPS tracking of its employee’s company-owned van
to investigate potential employee theft).
20. See, e.g., Carniol v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 975 N.Y.S.2d 842 (Sup. Ct. 2013)
(challenging employer’s use of GPS tracking data generated by its GPS devices installed in over
40,000 City of New York taxis), aff’d, 2 N.Y.S.3d 337 (App. Div. 2015).
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B. Contact Tracing by Cell Phone
Approximately ninety-five percent of the U.S. population owns a cell
phone, with most of those devices being smartphones.21 Most cell phones
sold since 2003 are GPS-enabled, making most phones trackable by GPS.22
Most cell phones are also equipped with Bluetooth technology.23 These
technologies have given rise to a variety of contact-tracing apps that seek to
determine whether a phone’s user has been in close proximity to the COVID19 virus.24
Contact tracing is a core disease-control measure that has been used for
centuries.25 Contact tracing requires a reliable process of identifying
potentially exposed or infected individuals, informing them of their potential
exposure, and helping them take appropriate action to protect their health and
prevent further transmission.26 According to the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (“CDC”), emerging technologies can assist in contact tracing
and may greatly help with scaling up these activities as needed.27
Until recently, contact tracing used old-fashioned methods, such as
people conducting interviews of infected individuals to determine their recent
interactions with others.28 The State of Massachusetts recently announced
21. Divya Ramjee, Pollyanna Sanderson & Imran Malek, Covid-19 and Digital Contact
Tracing: Regulating the Future of Public Health Surveillance, 2021 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO
101, 121 (2021).
22. Jeremy H. Rothstein, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment and the Use of Cell Phone
Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 493–94 (2012).
23. See Jaycon Systems, Bluetooth Technology: What Has Changed over the Years, MEDIUM
(Sept. 28, 2017), https://medium.com/jaycon-systems/bluetooth-technology-what-has-changedover-the-years-385da7ec7154; see also Molly Wood, Bluetooth Smart Improvements Appear in
More
Devices,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
29,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/technology/personaltech/bluetooth-improvements-appearin-more-devices.html (reporting that “Bluetooth and Wi-Fi are in almost everything these days, and
Bluetooth, in particular, is cheap to include and increasingly reliable”).
24. Browne, supra note 5.
25. Case Investigation and Contact Tracing: Part of a Multipronged Approach to Fight the
COVID-19 Pandemic, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 14, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/php/principles-contact-tracingbooklet.pdf [hereinafter Case Investigation and Contact Tracing]; see also Lawrence O. Gostin &
James G. Hodge, Jr., Piercing the Veil of Secrecy in HIV/AIDS and Other Sexually Transmitted
Diseases: Theories of Privacy and Disclosure in Partner Notification, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 9, 16 (1998).
26. See Case Investigation and Contact Tracing, supra note 25; see also Derek Thompson, The
Technology that Could Free America from Quarantine, ATLANTIC (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/contact-tracing-could-free-america-from-itsquarantine-nightmare/609577/ (“In its most basic form, tracing—otherwise known as tracking, or
contact tracing—means identifying all the recent interactions of sick individuals to determine whom
they might have infected. Testing plus tracing can besiege the virus, starve it of new bodies, and
return the world to its previral routine, or something like it.”).
27. Case Investigation and Contact Tracing, supra note 25.
28. Gostin & Hodge, Jr., supra note 25, at 14; Thompson, supra note 26.
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plans to hire 1,000 people to conduct these types of interviews.29 While
commendable, this approach to contact tracing is not ideal, as it is limited by
faulty memories of recent contacts and by the vast amount of personnel and
other resources required to contact trace in the midst of a global pandemic.30
Moreover, the possibility of transmitting COVID-19 between strangers and
asymptomatic carriers makes traditional contact tracing limited in its capacity
to identify potential exposures.31 To enable more widespread and more
reliable contact tracing, governments and employers are turning to cell phone
apps.32
1. Contact Tracing by Cell Phone GPS
Contact tracing through cell phone apps can take different forms, with
some apps relying on GPS technology (associated with location data), and
others relying on Bluetooth technology (associated with proximity data).33
The most intrusive forms of contact tracing are GPS-based apps and tracing
systems that rely on cell phone location data, which are in use by various
countries around the world.34 These GPS-based apps track the locations and

29. Martha Bebinger, Why Charlie Baker Thinks ‘Contact Tracing’ Cases May Help Mass.
Slow—Or
Stop—COVID-19,
WBUR
NEWS
(Apr.
3,
2020),
https://www.wbur.org/commonhealth/2020/04/03/contact-tracing-coronavirus-massachusettsbaker.
30. See Luca Ferretti et al., Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 Transmission Suggests Epidemic Control
with
Digital
Contact
Tracing,
SCIENCE
(May
8,
2020),
https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abb6936 (stating that “[t]raditional manual contacttracing procedures are not fast enough for [COVID-19]”); Thompson, supra note 26 (recognizing
that “[p]eople have faulty memories about who or what they’ve touched, or where they’ve been,”
and that “person-to-person interviews might be too slow to arrest a national pandemic accelerating
through a population”).
31. See Ramjee et al., supra note 21, at 105.
32. Thompson, supra note 26; see also Isobel Asher Hamilton, Compulsory Selfies and
Contact-Tracing: Authorities Everywhere Are Using Smartphones to Track the Coronavirus, and
It’s Part of a Massive Increase in Global Surveillance, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://www.businessinsider.com/countries-tracking-citizens-phones-coronavirus-20203?utm_source=markets&utm_medium=ingest#/#the-us-is-reportedly-gathering-data-from-the-adsindustry-to-get-an-idea-of-where-people-are-congregating-1 (reporting that “[g]overnments across
the world are availing every surveillance tool at their disposal to help stem the spread of the novel
coronavirus,” including “our smartphones”).
33. See Ramjee et al., supra note 21, at 111.
34. See HENRY KENYON, LOCATION RECORDING CONTACT TRACING APPS MUST BE
SCRAPPED, AMNESTY SAYS (June 19, 2020), 2020 WL 3401911 (describing mobile device contact
tracing apps in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Norway that use a centralized data collection method that
expose users’ location and personal data to potential government surveillance); see also Alan Z.
Rozenshtein, Disease Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, LAWFARE (Apr. 7, 2020, 1:54
PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/disease-surveillance-and-fourth-amendment (arguing that “if
the government were to track people’s movement by directly surveilling cellphones . . . that might
violate a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy”); Hamilton, supra note 32.
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movements of individual cell phones and communicate that information to a
centralized source, such as the national government.35
Relying in part on cell phone location data, South Korea utilizes a
program of mass surveillance that consists of tracking individuals’ phones,
credit card records, surveillance videos, and face-to-face interviews.36 This
information is then compiled into a publicly available map that allows
citizens to check whether they have been in contact with any infected
individuals.37 The system also enables the South Korean government to send
text messages warning people that they may have been in close proximity to
an infected individual.38 The location given can be extremely specific.39 The
Washington Post reported, for example, that a text, sent to over one million
phones, stated that an infected person visited the “Magic Coin Karaoke in
Jayang-dong at midnight on Feb. 20.”40 According to Yoon In-jin, a
professor of sociology at Korea University in Seoul, his country has seen
“many virus patients getting ridiculed and judged for places they visited.”41
And “[e]ven with names redacted, there are cases where enough information
was made public to deduce the patient’s identity.”42 As a result, one woman
reported that she stopped going to a bar popular with gay women: “If I
unknowingly contract the virus . . . that record will be released to the whole
country.”43 The woman added, “[i]t’s as daunting as being outed in front of
the public.”44
2. Cell Phone Contact Tracing Through Bluetooth
Bluetooth is arguably the least invasive of the cell phone contact tracing
methods.45 An app that relies on Bluetooth essentially permits users’ phones
to communicate with each other when in close proximity.46 Australia’s
contact tracing app is one example. Australia’s app, called COVIDSafe,
35. See KENYON, supra note 34; Ramjee et al., supra note 21, at 112.
36. Min Joo Kim & Simon Denyer, A ‘Travel Log’ of the Times in South Korea: Mapping the
Movements
of
Coronavirus
Carriers,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
13,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/coronavirus-south-korea-trackingapps/2020/03/13/2bed568e-5fac-11ea-ac50-18701e14e06d_story.html.
37. Hamilton, supra note 32.
38. Hamilton, supra note 32; Kim & Denyer, supra note 36.
39. Hamilton, supra note 32.
40. Kim & Denyer, supra note 36.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Ramjee et al., supra note 21, at 113 (stating that “Bluetooth technology is associated
with fewer privacy risks than GPS”).
46. See Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The First Amendment and Networked
Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1, 20 n.92 (2007).
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enables cell phones to conduct a “digital handshake” when they come within
five feet of each other, then notifies users if they have come into contact for
longer than fifteen minutes with an infected person.47 The app does not
collect location data, and an infected person must consent to having their data
shared.48
In America, consulting giant PriceWaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”) has
developed a cell phone app that uses Bluetooth to track employee
interactions.49 The PwC tracing device requires workers to either download
an app on their cell phone or add the code for the contact tracing app to an
existing corporate app, enter their work e-mail address, and consent to the
data policy.50 Once installed, the PwC app runs in the background throughout
the day and uses Bluetooth and Wi-Fi data to determine employees’
proximity to one another and the amount of time employees spend
interacting.51 If an employee reports a COVID-19 infection, management
then enters the person’s email address into the tracing system to identify other
employees the individual has come in contact with during a specified time
frame.52 The system ranks each contact’s risk level—high, medium, or
low—based on the individual’s proximity to the person with the virus.53 In
this respect, one’s “risk factor is a calculation of distance and time, not
location.”54 According to PwC, the app does not track anyone’s location or
analyze data outside of work.55 Rather, the app uses geofencing to limit
tracing to corporate offices only.56 As of May 2020, more than fifty PwC
clients had expressed interest in the device, including some of America’s
biggest banks, manufacturers, and energy companies.57

47. Kim Lyons, Australia’s COVIDSafe Contact Tracing App Already Has More than a Million
Downloads,
VERGE
(Apr.
26,
2020,
6:39
PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/26/21237598/australia-coronavirus-contact-tracing-privacy.
48. Id.
49. Browne, supra note 5; Kif Leswing, Companies Could Require Employees to Install
Coronavirus-Tracing Apps Like This One From PwC Before Coming Back to Work, CNBC (May
6, 2020, 8:24 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/06/pwc-is-building-coronavirus-contacttracing-software-for-companies.html.
50. Putzier & Cutter, supra note 3; see also Veronica Combs, New Coronavirus Contact
Tracing Tool Could Help Offices Reopen by Tracking Employees, TECHREPUBLIC (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/pwc-repurposes-iot-platform-to-make-contact-trackingfaster-and-easier-for-employers/.
51. Putzier & Cutter, supra note 3; Combs, supra note 50; see also Leswing, supra note 49
(describing how the PwC app works).
52. Combs, supra note 50.
53. Id.
54. Id. (quoting Rob Mesirow, the principal for IoT services at PwC).
55. Putzier & Cutter, supra note 3.
56. Combs, supra note 50.
57. Putzier & Cutter, supra note 3.
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Similar to the PwC app, Social Safety has developed an app for
employees’ mobile devices that uses Bluetooth technology to detect the
distance between other devices running the app.58 According to the
company’s website, employers can “require [their] employees to install the
app on their personal mobile devices and have it active from an armband
[holding their phone] while they attend work.”59 Once deployed, Social
Safety signals employees through sounds, vibration, and light display when
employees come closer than six feet apart.60 As employees get closer
together, the alerts become more urgent.61 In addition, “the app keeps a
secure, private record of accidental close contact between people” so that the
employer may notify employees of potential exposure when an infection
occurs.62
Beyond the employment context, Google and Apple recently partnered
on COVID-19 contact tracing technology that users may download to their
cell phones.63 The State of California, among others, has employed the
contact tracing technology through an app that relies on Bluetooth to send
alerts to phones that have been in close proximity to someone who tests
positive for COVID-19.64 The app, called CA Notify, can be enabled by
iPhone users in their device’s settings, and can be downloaded to Android
devices through the Google Play Store.65 After the app is activated, the
individual’s phone automatically exchanges a private key with another phone
that is within Bluetooth range.66 The key does not contain location data or
any personally identifying information, and the keys change every fifteen

58. The Social Safety App: Keeping Your Employees Safe Through Social Distancing, SOC.
SAFETY, https://socialsafety.app (last visited Mar. 5, 2022).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Apple and Google Partner on COVID-19 Contact Tracing Technology, GOOGLE (Apr. 10,
2020),
https://www.blog.google/inside-google/company-announcements/apple-and-googlepartner-covid-19-contact-tracing-technology/.
64. Slow the Spread of COVID-19, CA NOTIFY, https://canotify.ca.gov (last visited Oct. 13,
2021). According to the California government, CA Notify uses Bluetooth Low Energy technology
to exchange random codes with the phones of others who have opted in without revealing any
information about the users. If another CA Notify user that has been near an individual in the last
two weeks tests positive for COVID-19, the potentially exposed person will then receive an
anonymous notification that they have potentially been exposed. Id.
65. Id.
66. Mitchell Clark, Apple and Google’s COVID Contact Tracing Tech Is Finally Coming to
Their
Home
State
of
California,
VERGE
(Dec.
7,
2020,
5:50
PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/12/7/22159842/apple-google-covid-contact-tracing-techcalifornia.
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minutes.67 When someone tests positive, they can send a notification to every
other person using the app whose phone virtually bumped into theirs, letting
them know that they should get tested and quarantine.68 Such exposure
notification does not include any information about who exposed whom or
when and where it happened.69
C. Wearable Contact Tracing Devices
A variety of “wearable trackers” have also been used by employers in
lieu of cell phone apps. One company, Estimote, has sold wireless tracking
beacons to companies like Amazon, Apple, and Nike for contact tracing
purposes.70 According to the company’s website, workers can wear small
wireless devices––resembling a keycard, watch, or small garage door
opener––that remind them to keep a safe distance from one another.71 The
wearables work by transmitting “encrypted short-range wireless signals,”
which other wearables pick up and vibrate if they are too close.72 The
wearables also “remember these direct contact interactions.”73 In the event
an employee becomes ill, a company can examine its contact tracing
dashboard and identify other individuals who may be at risk.74
Other companies have developed similar technologies––usually
embedded in bracelets or wristbands––that notify workers if they are too
close together, permitting contact tracing and virus exposure notifications
through Bluetooth, rather than GPS. Examples of those technologies include

67. Id.; see also Slow the Spread of COVID-19, supra note 64. According to the State of
California, the system never collects or shares any location data or personal information with
Google, Apple, California Health and Human Services, or other users. Id.
68. Clark, supra note 66.
69. Id.
70. Will Knight, Tech Could Be Used to Track Employees – in the Name of Health, WIRED
(May 17, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/tech-used-track-employees-name-health/.
71. ESTIMOTE, https://estimote.com/wearable/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2022).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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AiRISTA Flow75 and TraceSafe.76 Another similar technology is Safezone,77
which has been used by professional sports leagues, including the NBA.78
Like cell phone apps that rely on Bluetooth, the Safezone tracing device is
designed to record only user interactions as a function of distance and
duration of contact, rather than location.79
Another similar technology is Universal Contact Tracing, which
operates with Bluetooth beacons embedded in wristbands or badges.80 As
people go through their day, interactions between individual badge numbers
are recorded, noting time, location, and duration.81 This data is accumulated
anonymously, remaining unused unless a COVID-19 diagnosis is reported.82
Another company has developed a similar technology, called Proximity
Trace or TraceTag, that facilitates contact tracing through a device affixed to
an employee’s hardhat.83 Like similar wearable devices, the Proximity Trace
75. AIRISTA,
https://www.airistaflow.com/industries/government/social-distancing-andcontact-tracing/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2022) (describing a wireless device worn by employees––worn
as a wrist strap, pendant, or key fob––that detects proximity to other tags using Bluetooth and alerts
users that come within six feet of each other, noting further that “[t]he system can integrate securely
with government databases and third-party applications”).
76. TRACESAFE, https://web.archive.org/web/20201230063926/https://www.tracesafe.io/ (last
visited Dec. 30, 2020) (describing TraceSafe as “a full suite of real-time location management
services and contact tracing solutions enabled through advanced low-power bluetooth beacons in a
variety of form factors to suit”); TraceSafe Selected as Official Contact Tracing Solution for TD
Garden,
TRACESAFE
(Dec.
8,
2020),
https://globaluploads.webflow.com/5f0b2c52fd55612aa6935ad5/5fceec40f759a26a71a195c0_TraceSafe%20Se
lected%20as%20Official%20Contact%20Tracing%20for%20TD%20Garden.pdf (explaining that
TraceSafe utilizes a patented contact tracing bracelet).
77. KINEXON, https://kinexon.com/safezone (last visited Mar. 3, 2022) (describing an “ultralightweight wearable [that] actively warns users if they are too close to another,” and noting that
“[t]he proximity and duration of each contact is recorded and can be quickly accessed to trace and
evaluate chains of infection”).
78. Baxter Holmes, NBA to Require Players to Wear Sensors as Part of Contact Tracing, ESPN
(Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/30628788/nba-require-players-wearsensors-part-contact-tracing (reporting that the NBA plans to require players and staff to wear
Kinexon SafeZone contact sensor devices on the team plane, the team bus, during practices, and to
and from the arena or their home practice facility).
79. See Technology, KINEXON, https://kinexon.com/technology/safetag/ (last visited Mar. 3,
2022) (“The KINEXON SafeTag does not record any movement, position or health data of the
employees. Only the distance between two sensors is measured and the duration of the contact.
This measurement is independent of the contact location and completely pseudonymized as well as
randomized.”).
80. Animation:
How
Universal
Contact
Tracing
Works,
MICROSHARE,
https://www.microshare.io/2020/06/18/animation-how-universal-contact-tracing-works/
(last
visited Mar. 4, 2022) (describing its Universal Contact Tracing technology that secures occupants
of a facility without the use of smartphone apps).
81. Microshare, Inc., Animation: How Universal Contact Tracing Works, YOUTUBE (June 22,
2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h9gWX3CAf_M.
82. Id.
83. In the Time of COVID-19–How Will You Maintain Safe Working Distances?, TRIAX,
https://www.triaxtec.com/social-distancing-contact-tracing/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2024).
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device provides workers with visual and audible alarms when they get too
close to one another, and more passively collects and records worker
interactions for contact tracing purposes.84
D. Video Monitoring of Employees at Work
Numerous contact tracing technologies have been developed that rely
on hardware installed around the workplace, including cameras and sensors.85
Amazon, for example, utilizes “Distance Assistant,” which provides live
feedback to employees on social distancing through a camera, a fifty-inch
monitor, and a computer.86 As people walk past the camera, a monitor
displays live video with visual overlays to show if associates are within six
feet of one another.87 Individuals remaining six feet apart are highlighted
with green circles, while those who are closer together are highlighted with
red circles.88 Amazon recently open sourced this technology so that anyone
can create their own Distance Assistant.89
In a more robust version of camera-based tracking, the Network of
Intelligent Camera Ecosystem (“NICE”) Alliance “provides an infrastructure
for gathering and sorting massive amounts of raw video data . . . from
multiple cameras that is time and space relevant.”90 “This process of sorting
and organizing is performed in real time as the video is produced,” thus
enabling “real time processing of big video data.”91 Once compiled, video is
indexed and becomes easily searchable by the user.92
Working with Microsoft, the NICE Alliance is developing a system that
could allow any connected camera to become a smart camera capable of
detecting a lack of social distancing, unmasked individuals, or even fevers.93

84. Id.
85. See PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 5, at 10–11 (listing in Table 3 various tracking technologies
that rely on cameras, sensors, etc.).
86. Brad Porter, Amazon Introduces ‘Distance Assistant,’ AMAZON (June 23, 2020),
https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/operations/amazon-introduces-distance-assistant.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Overview Version 1.0.1, NICE ALL. 5 (2019), https://www.nicealliance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/02/nice-overview-v1.0.1.pdf.
91. Id.
92. Id. For information on how NICE manages privacy concerns, see Priv. & Sec. Specification
Version 1.0.1, NICE ALL. (2019), https://www.nicealliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/niceprivacy-and-security-specification-v1.0.1.pdf.
93. Hillary K. Grigonis, Post Lockdown, Smart Cameras Could Help Enforce Mask Use and
Social
Distancing,
DIGIT.
TRENDS
(May
18,
2020),
https://www.digitaltrends.com/photography/nice-alliance-pandemic-security-cameras/. The NICE
Alliance is a group of several camera manufacturers working together to create an operating system
where cameras from multiple brands can talk to each other. Id. The NICE system is designed to
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The cameras could send a text alert to business owners when a location is too
crowded or social distancing rules are violated, or even trigger a warning in
public spaces, such as a warning light.94
The NICE system works by looking for specific scenarios and only
uploading data to the cloud that meets specified criteria.95 If the camera
detects more than two people at an entrance, for example, the data would then
be sent to the cloud.96 Besides leaving much of the information off the cloud
entirely, the system uses encryption on any personal ID.97 Facial detection
looks only for the presence of a face mask.98 Moreover, the system can use
seen attributes—such as the color of a shirt or a hat—to identify a person’s
location without sharing or recording their identity.99
E. Other Forms of Location Tracking
Along with the more mainstream forms of contact tracing described
above, other tracking technologies are being developed that have the
potential to become far more invasive. For example, one company recently
developed a work badge that not only tracks the movements of employees,
but also captures the tone and length of workplace conversations.100 The data
produced by the badge can then be used to analyze things such as how much
time workers talk to individuals of a particular sex, how much time they
spend speaking versus listening, and how much they move around in a day.101
In a potentially more invasive form of surveillance, employees of a
Wisconsin company, Three Square Market (“32M”), recently had radiofrequency identification (“RFID”) chips implanted in their forearms.102 The
company’s stated goal for this technology is to make routine employee tasks
more efficient by, for example, allowing employees to use the installed RFID
chip to make purchases in the break room, open doors, and log in to their
computers.103 32M has emphasized that its RFID technology does not
work with existing cameras, requiring just a router instead of the replacement of every camera in
the system. Id.
94. Grigonis, supra note 93.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Hirsch, supra note 4; see also There Will Be Little Privacy in the Workplace of the Future,
ECONOMIST (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/03/28/there-will-belittle-privacy-in-the-workplace-of-the-future.
101. Hirsch, supra note 4, at 928.
102. Joseph Jerome, Embedded Chip on Your Shoulder? Some Privacy and Security
Considerations, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIV. PRO. (Aug. 1, 2017), https://iapp.org/news/a/embedded-chipon-your-shoulder-some-privacy-and-security-considerations/.
103. Id.
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involve GPS tracking; however, the technology is capable of location
tracking, potentially enabling an employer to track individuals on a roundthe-clock basis.104
In their efforts to combat COVID-19, some employers have also
developed a broader set of “health surveillance” technologies that rely, in
part, on facial recognition scans.105 One example is Health Pass by
CLEAR.106 Users can download the CLEAR app on their smartphones and
enroll in the service by verifying their identity using facial recognition.107 To
enter the workplace, users snap a selfie to authenticate their identity and take
a health quiz on possible COVID-19 symptoms.108 Users then approach a
CLEAR pod for screening, where they use their face or a QR code generated
by the app to share their health data and verified ID.109 Based on the results,
they would then either be admitted to or rejected from the workplace.110
A similar facial recognition technology that can be used by both
businesses and employers is PopID, which uses a person’s face as their form
of identification.111 Users of the PopID technology sign up with a selfie,
which is then translated into a secure digital key and stored in the PopID
cloud.112 Users who have saved payment information can then choose to be
recognized at any PopID-enabled business by standing in front of a camera.113
From there, the PopID cloud matches the encrypted image to the user’s
digital key and permits payment with just the user’s face.114 In the

104. Id. Likewise, in Sweden, about 3,000 people recently had a microchip implanted in their
bodies in exchange for making their lives easier. For instance, rather than have a physical keycard
to unlock doors, they can wave their hand that contains the chip to perform the same task. Alexandra
Ma, Thousands of People in Sweden Are Embedding Microchips Under Their Skin to Replace ID
Cards, INSIDER (May 14, 2018, 8:09 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/swedish-peopleembed-microchips-under-skin-to-replace-id-cards-20185#:~:text=Thousands%20of%20Swedes%20are%20having,%2C%20Agence%20France%2DPress
e%20reported.
105. Bryan Walsh, Exclusive: Biometric ID Company CLEAR to Offer Coronavirus Screening
for Businesses, AXIOS (May 10, 2020), https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-health-screeningdigital-id-48f5ee5b-05c4-4b5e-8fda-4d2f59b946b0.html.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. With PopID, Your Face is Your ID, POPID, https://www.popid.com/#howitworks (last
visited Mar. 4, 2022).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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employment context, PopID can be used as a means of providing
“[s]implified building access and temperature check at work.”115
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS APPLIED TO PUBLIC EMPLOYERS
Because there is no single privacy law in America, employees may be
protected from privacy invasions by various laws, including federal and state
statutes, tort law, and constitutional requirements.116 This Part summarizes
the most common workplace privacy claims advanced by litigants to
challenge instances of employee tracking by public employers.117
When an employee of a public employer believes their privacy rights
were violated, they will usually sue their employer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and allege a violation of her constitutional right to be free from “unreasonable
searches and seizures” under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.118 Although the Fourth Amendment contains over fifty words,
its core protection is to prohibit “unreasonable searches and seizures.”119
115. Id. PopID has other applications beyond the employment context, such as device-free
payments at drive-through restaurants, kiosk login and ordering at restaurants, and ticketless entry
to event venues. Id.
116. See Mauricio Paez & Mike La Marca, The Internet of Things: Emerging Legal Issues for
Businesses, 43 N. KY. L. REV. 29, 40 n.68 (2016). Privacy-related statutes typically apply to
specific industries or particular types of data. Id.
117. Because this Article focuses on workplace privacy claims under the Fourth Amendment, it
does not address other laws that might apply to employer-initiated contact tracing. See supra note
9 and accompanying text. This Article also does not address contact tracing by private employers,
which, given the lack of state action, are typically not subject to Fourth Amendment constraints.
See Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1989) (stating that “[t]he [Fourth]
Amendment [protects] . . . persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the
[g]overnment or those acting at their direction” (citing Camara v. Mun. Ct. of San Francisco, 387
U.S. 523, 528 (1967))). For alleged privacy invasions, private employers may face liability through
tort law, including the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, which is commonly used to sue private
employers for privacy invasions arising out of workplace searches and seizures. See RESTATEMENT
OF EMP. LAW § 7.06 (AM. L. INST. 2015) (discussing the tort of intrusion); see, e.g., Sunbelt Rentals,
Inc. v. Victor, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1033–34 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (discussing a tort of intrusion claim
based on an employer’s search of an employee’s cell phone); Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177,
181 (Iowa 2011) (involving a tort of intrusion claim challenging an employer’s installation of a
hidden video camera in the employee restroom); K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d
632, 636 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (involving a tort of intrusion claim challenging an employer’s search
of an employee’s locker). As noted, however, the question of whether a private employer’s contact
tracing program would lead to liability in tort is beyond the scope of this Article.
118. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (“To state a claim under
§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
color of state law.” (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981))); see, e.g., O’Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 714 (1987) (involving a Fourth Amendment claim based on an employer’s
search of a public employee’s office).
119. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977)
(“The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all
the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’”
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Expounding on this core protection, courts have broken Fourth Amendment
analysis into three steps. In the first step, courts consider whether a Fourth
Amendment “search” or “seizure” has occurred.120 If a “search” or “seizure”
has occurred, then courts turn to the second step to consider whether that
action was “unreasonable,” that is, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.121
If such a constitutional violation is established, courts move to the final step
by considering the proper remedy, if any, for the Fourth Amendment
violation.122 Each of these steps to Fourth Amendment claims are outlined
in more detail below, with an emphasis on how the Fourth Amendment
restrains public employers.
A. Step One: Determining Whether a “Search” or “Seizure” Has
Occurred
In the first step of Fourth Amendment analysis, courts consider whether
a Fourth Amendment “search” or “seizure” has occurred. This is the critical
threshold issue in Fourth Amendment analysis because without a search or
seizure, no Fourth Amendment action has occurred, without which there can
be no Fourth Amendment violation.123
1. Fourth Amendment Seizures
Fourth Amendment claims may involve seizures of persons or seizures
of property. Under Fourth Amendment precedent, a “‘seizure’ of property
occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s
possessory interests in that property.”124 A seizure would occur, for example,

(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968))); Carniol v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 975
N.Y.S.2d 842, 848–49 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (applying a general reasonableness analysis to an instance
of employer-initiated GPS tracking), aff’d, 2 N.Y.S.3d 337 (App. Div. 2015); see also Rozenshtein,
supra note 34 (noting that in Fourth Amendment special needs cases, courts generally “balance[]
the intrusiveness of the search against the expected government benefits of that search and also ask[]
whether the government could achieve its objective using less intrusive means”).
120. United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 177 (3d Cir. 2006).
121. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353–54 (1967) (after finding that a “search
and seizure” had occurred, examining “[t]he question remaining for decision . . . [of] whether the
search and seizure conducted in this case complied with constitutional standards”); see also Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (finding that no “search” had occurred, and therefore
“no warrant was required”).
122. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
123. See United States v. Raines, 536 F.2d 796, 801 n.6 (8th Cir. 1976); see also Martin R.
Gardner, Rediscovering Trespass: Towards a Regulatory Approach to Defining Fourth Amendment
Scope in a World of Advancing Technology, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 1027, 1030 (2014) (“It has long been
understood that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable without a ‘search or seizure,’ no matter how
unreasonable a governmental intrusion would appear to be.” (footnote omitted)).
124. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696 (1983)).
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when police take a person’s property into police possession.125 In the
employment context, a seizure of data might occur when an employer
downloads the contents of an employee’s private cell phone onto the
employer’s work computer in order to search those contents.126
Employment-related challenges involving seizures of persons are less
common but sometimes occur. As a general principle, a person is seized
under the Fourth Amendment when there has been “a meaningful
interference with his freedom of movement.”127
2. Fourth Amendment Searches
Under Fourth Amendment law, the term “search” is a legal term of art
distinct from its ordinary dictionary definition.128 To determine whether a
Fourth Amendment “search” has occurred, courts typically apply the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test derived from Katz v. United
States.129 Under the Katz test, a Fourth Amendment “search” occurs when
the government violates a person’s expectation of privacy that society
recognizes as reasonable or legitimate.130
Under the Katz test, whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable
depends on context, and may turn on a host of factors.131 In the employment
context, the most significant factors affecting whether an employee may
reasonably expect privacy include: (1) who owns the property subject to
intrusion, recognizing that employees may typically expect greater privacy
in personally-owned devices as opposed to property owned by their

125. Id. at 120 n.18.
126. See Larios v. Lunardi, 445 F. Supp. 3d 778, 782 (E.D. Cal. 2020).
127. Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989). See generally United States
v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465, 1467–68 (10th Cir. 1996) (summarizing the types of Fourth Amendment
seizures).
128. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 n.1 (2001) (contrasting the Fourth Amendment
definition of “search” with the dictionary definition of “search”).
129. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
130. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”); see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 (discussing
this framework); United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (speaking in terms of
a “legitimate expectation of privacy,” or “one that society is prepared to accept as objectively
reasonable”).
131. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (recognizing that “the reasonableness
of an expectation of privacy . . . is understood to differ according to context”). Compare Leventhal
v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding, based on the particular facts of the case, that
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his office computer), with
United States v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246, 1248 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding employee had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a personal computer he used at work).
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employers;132 (2) whether an employee has been notified of, and consented
to, the employer’s conduct;133 and (3) whether the area or item searched was
widely accessible, or instead accessible only to the individual claiming an
expectation of privacy.134 Additional factors that commonly affect
expectations of privacy under Fourth Amendment precedents include: (4) the
location of the search;135 (5) the intrusiveness of the investigative
technique;136 and (6) the manner of investigation.137

132. See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 778 F. Supp. 2d 651, 654 (E.D. Va. 2011); United
States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000).
133. See, e.g., Simons, 206 F.3d at 398 (recognizing that “office practices, procedures, or
regulations may reduce legitimate privacy expectations” of government employees in their offices);
United States v. Sihler, 562 F.2d 349, 350–51 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding search of employee justified
by consent where sign at entryway stated that all persons entering the workplace “are subject to
routine searches of their person, property or packages” (emphasis omitted)); United States v. Esser,
284 F. App’x 757, 759 (11th Cir. 2008) (same as Sihler); see also Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 655 (Cal. 1994) (recognizing that “the presence or absence of opportunities to
consent voluntarily to activities impacting privacy interests obviously affects the expectations of the
participant”); United States v. Yudong Zhu, 23 F. Supp. 3d 234, 240–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(upholding computer search over Fourth Amendment challenge in part because employee gave
written consent to inspection); United States v. Hamilton, 778 F. Supp. 2d 651, 654 (E.D. Va. 2011)
(finding public school employee could not reasonably expect privacy in e-mails with his wife stored
on his work computer because he knew contents of his computer were subject to inspection).
134. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 718 (recognizing that “some government offices may be so open
to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable”). Regarding this
factor, an employee could not reasonably expect privacy in most activities conducted in an open-air
cubicle at work, such as a telephone conversation occurring within earshot of a fellow employee.
See id. On the other hand, “if [an] employer equips the employee’s office with a safe or file cabinet
or other receptacle in which to keep his private papers, he can assume that the contents of the safe
are private.” Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing O’Connor, 480
U.S. at 718–19).
135. In the criminal investigation context, for example, the Supreme Court has ruled that dog
sniffs do not constitute Fourth Amendment searches when the dog sniff occurs in the airport, United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (involving a dog sniff of a passenger’s luggage), or on a
public road, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406, 410 (2005) (involving a dog sniff around an
automobile lawfully stopped on the highway). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has ruled that
use of a drug-sniffing dog on the front porch of a home is a Fourth Amendment search. Florida v.
Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2013).
136. Generally speaking, the closer one gets to a person’s body, the more invasive the search or
seizure becomes. A strip search, for example, requires a greater degree of suspicion than a search
of a person’s backpack or outer clothing. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S.
364, 373–77 (2009) (upholding warrantless search of a teenage girl’s backpack and outer clothing
while striking down a search of her undergarments).
137. This factor is often significant when sophisticated technology is used in an investigation.
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–36 (2001) (striking down warrantless police use
of a thermal imaging device to scan the outside of a suspect’s home and recognizing that searches
conducted via sophisticated technologies are fundamentally distinct from those that are not); United
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (distinguishing GPS
monitoring from “lawful conventional surveillance techniques”).
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Beyond these relatively common factors, any other relevant factor in the
case at hand may impact whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable.138
In addition, a person’s status can fundamentally alter his or her expectations
of privacy. Prisoners, public school students, and arrestees, for example,
generally have reduced expectations of privacy as compared to ordinary adult
citizens.139 Along these lines, due to the nature of the employment
relationship, employees generally have lesser expectations of privacy vis-àvis their employers than they have in other contexts.140
As an alternative to the Katz test, courts sometimes apply the physical
trespass test to determine whether a Fourth Amendment “search” has
occurred.141 Under this test, rather than examining whether it would be
reasonable to expect privacy in the case, courts consider whether the
government sought to obtain information by physically intruding on a
constitutionally protected area, such as a “house” or “effect.”142 Such a
trespass occurs when a government agent, without consent, encroaches an
area or object protected by the Fourth Amendment, such as a vehicle or a
home, in order to find something or obtain information.143
The physical trespass test, while important, has not been applied to
employer-initiated investigations as often as the reasonable expectation of
privacy test.144 This is mostly due to the historical development of the two
138. See State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399, 407–08 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (listing factors
courts use in deciding whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or object
searched); State v. Tentoni, 871 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015) (listing similar factors);
Vega-Rodriguez v. P.R. Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing common factors as
including whether the work area in question was given over to an employee’s exclusive use, the
extent to which others had access to the work space, the nature of the employment, and whether
office regulations placed employees on notice of potential employer intrusions).
139. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 463 (2013) (stating that a person’s “expectations of
privacy and freedom from police scrutiny are [often] reduced” after an arrest); State v. Kisack, 236
So. 3d 1201, 1204 (La. 2017) (per curiam) (recognizing that “prisoners have a reduced expectation
of privacy” under Fourth Amendment law); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656–
57 (1995) (recognizing that K-12 students have a reduced expectation of privacy); see also Bernard
James, T.L.O. and Cell Phones: Student Privacy and Smart Devices After Riley v. California, 101
IOWA L. REV. 343, 350–51 (2015) (discussing K–12 cases).
140. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723–25 (1987); RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW § 7.01
cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2015) (recognizing that “employees have different expectations of privacy than
they may have outside of the workplace”).
141. See United States v. Cowan, 674 F.3d 947, 955 (8th Cir. 2012).
142. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (establishing, in
pertinent part, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures”).
143. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 410 (2012); Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11 (“That the
officers learned what they learned only by physically intruding on Jardines’ property to gather
evidence is enough to establish that a search occurred.”); id. at 7–10 (discussing the lack of consent
by Jardines).
144. See generally Matthew Tokson, The Normative Fourth Amendment, 104 MINN. L. REV.
741, 741 (2019) (recognizing that searches are currently “largely defined by the Katz test”).
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tests––the physical trespass doctrine dominated Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence in the early 1900’s, whereas the reasonable expectation of
privacy test took center stage as a result of the Court’s 1967 decision in
Katz.145 Due to Katz’s emphasis on expectations of privacy, the physical
trespass test became less prominent in search analysis until it was revived by
the United States Supreme Court in 2012.146 Thereafter, courts began
considering both tests in modern “search” cases.147
B. Step Two: Determining Whether the Search or Seizure is
“Reasonable”
If a court determines that a Fourth Amendment search or seizure has
occurred, the court then determines whether the search or seizure was
reasonable.148 Exactly what makes a search or seizure reasonable varies by
context. In the criminal investigation context, warrants and probable cause
are often required for a search or seizure to be reasonable.149 Neither warrants
nor probable cause are required, however, when a search or seizure is
conducted for a non-law enforcement, or a “special needs” purpose, as in the
case of searches conducted by public school officials,150 building
inspectors,151 and public employers.152 Because such government actors are
usually not engaged in criminal investigations, where warrants and probable
145. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 (noting that “for most of our history the Fourth Amendment was
understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons,
houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
(declaring that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places”).
146. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 405–06; United States v. Johnson, 871 F. Supp. 2d 539, 546 (W.D.
La. 2012) (“Jones established, or perhaps reiterated, that there are two ways to analyze [whether a
Fourth Amendment ‘search’ has occurred]: a traditional common-law property rights test and the
Katz/reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test.”).
147. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–07. In Jones, the Court held that a Fourth Amendment search
occurred when police obtained location information by trespassorily attaching a GPS tracking
device to a criminal suspect’s vehicle. Id. at 404. The Court did not reach the question of whether
a search would have occurred under the alternative reasonable expectation of privacy test. Id. at
406. See generally Kathryn E. Fifield, Let This Jardines Grow: The Case for Curtilage Protection
in Common Spaces, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 147, 158–60 (2017) (discussing the historical development
of the two search tests and concluding that the two tests “now exist side by side in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence”).
148. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
149. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (“Over and again this Court has emphasized that . . . searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.” (footnote omitted)). Although warrants require a showing of probable
cause, U.S. CONST. amend. IV, many warrant exceptions also require probable cause. See
McAllister, supra note 18, at 1273 n.42.
150. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985).
151. See Camara v. Mun. Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
152. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720–25 (1987) (rejecting the warrant and probable
cause requirements in the employment context).
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cause are more appropriate, their actions must instead be “reasonable[] under
all the circumstances,” a requirement that is less rigorous than probable
cause.153
In the employment context, to be “reasonable[] under all the
circumstances,” a search or seizure must be both reasonable at its inception
and reasonable in scope.154 According to the United States Supreme Court’s
opinion in O’Connor v. Ortega, a search by an employer will be reasonable
at its inception when the employer has “reasonable grounds for suspecting”
either (a) that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of
work-related misconduct (like a suspected company theft), or (b) that the
search is necessary for a noninvestigatory, work-related purpose (like
entering an office to retrieve a needed file).155 Built into these standards is a
requirement that the search be “work-related,” or based on some legitimate
employer interest.156 In addition, as used here, the term “reasonable grounds
for suspecting” is synonymous with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable
suspicion standard,157 one that is less demanding than probable cause.158
According to O’Connor, a search will be reasonable in scope when “the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and
not excessively intrusive in light of [either] the nature of the [suspected]
[misconduct]” or the overall circumstances giving rise to the search.159 Under
this standard, the suspicion that justifies the search helps delineate its

153. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725–26; see also id. at 723–24 (recognizing that “public employers
must be given wide latitude to enter employee offices for work-related, noninvestigatory reasons,”
and reaching a similar conclusion for searches conducted pursuant to an investigation of workrelated employee misconduct).
154. See id. at 725–26.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 761 (2011).
157. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 724 (“The delay in correcting the employee misconduct caused by
the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible and
often irreparable damage to the agency’s work, and ultimately to the public interest.”). Although
O’Connor sometimes used the phrase “reasonable grounds for suspecting,” this phrase has been
used by the Supreme Court in Fourth Amendment cases as a substitute for the “reasonable
suspicion” standard. See United States v. Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (recognizing
that the Court’s phrase “reasonable to believe” “probably is akin to the ‘reasonable suspicion’
standard”). Moreover, the O’Connor language itself has been interpreted by courts as requiring a
showing of “reasonable suspicion.” See Cunningham II, 997 N.E.2d 468, 473 (N.Y. 2013).
158. Comparing these two standards, the Supreme Court summarized “the required knowledge
component of probable cause” as “rais[ing] a ‘fair probability’ or a ‘substantial chance’ of
discovering evidence of criminal activity,” and described “[t]he lesser standard” of reasonable
suspicion as “a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing.” Safford Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009) (citation omitted).
159. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (third alteration in original) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 326 (1985)).
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permissible scope.160 For example, if an employer has sufficient reason to
believe an employee has a red-colored file in her office that contains evidence
of certain employee misconduct, the employer would be justified in entering
that office and searching through any file cabinet or container large enough
to hold that particular file.161 Importantly, however, the right to search for
the file extends only to those areas where it could reasonably be concealed.162
Accordingly, in this example, it would not be reasonable to search inside a
tiny pill bottle, nor would it be reasonable to search through a box of manilacolored files. Finally, once the red-colored file is found, the search should
end so as to be no more intrusive than necessary.163
Beyond these basic requirements, O’Connor emphasized that judicial
oversight of public employer searches would not be particularly rigorous and
that public employers should be afforded “wide latitude” to perform such
intrusions.164 On the other hand, the Court suggested that the “workplace”
exception to the warrant requirement would not apply beyond “the
boundaries of the workplace context” itself, which the Court delineated as
“those areas and items that are related to work and are generally within the
employer’s control.”165 As an example, the Court pointed to a hospital, where

160. See, e.g., Quon, 560 U.S. at 761 (finding employer’s review of text message transcripts
reasonable because it was an efficient and expedient way to determine whether overages were the
result of work-related messaging or personal use); see also Zimmerman v. Knight, 421 F. Supp. 3d
514, 522–23 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (discussing whether an employer’s download of 2,731 pages of text
messages, photographs, web browser history, and call history from Plaintiff’s cell phone was
reasonable in scope by examining whether the downloaded material was relevant to the employee
misconduct inquiry).
161. Cf. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION 218 (Thomson West 2004) (discussing scope of consent principles,
and stating that “when the object the police indicated they are looking for could be concealed
therein, they may even search unlocked containers found in that place”).
162. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
VOLUME 1: INVESTIGATION 257 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing scope of search principles under the
Fourth Amendment, and recognizing that “it would be improper for [the searching party] to open a
container too small to hide the object of the search”).
163. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP. LAW § 7.06 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2015) (recognizing, under the
tort of intrusion, that “[i]f the scope [of search] extends beyond the purpose of the intrusion in
furthering the employer’s legitimate business interest, the intrusion is unjustified”); see also, e.g.,
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (upholding an immediate warrantless search of a home for
potential homicide victims by officers inside the home when a shooting occurred, but striking down
a subsequent warrantless search of the entire premises by different officers occurring after the
emergency ended); Cunningham II, 997 N.E.2d 468, 473 (N.Y. 2013) (finding an employer’s thirtyday surreptitious GPS tracking of its employee’s private vehicle unlawful because unreasonable in
scope).
164. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 723–25. This is because, according to the Court, the employer’s
interest in efficient operation of the workplace is “substantial,” whereas employees have limited
expectations of privacy at work, which “are far less than those found at home or in some other
contexts.” Id. at 724–25.
165. Id. at 715.

2022]

CONTACT TRACING

975

the workplace would include “hallways, [the] cafeteria, offices, desks, and
file cabinets,” which “remain part of the workplace context even if the
employee has placed personal items in them.”166 The Court cautioned,
however, that “[n]ot everything that passes through the confines of the
business address can be considered part of the workplace context.”167 The
Court noted, for example, that the workplace exception “does not necessarily
apply to a piece of closed personal luggage . . . that happens to be within the
employer’s business address,” such as when an employee brings “closed
luggage to the office prior to leaving on a trip” (presumably because such an
item would not be one that is “related to work and . . . generally within the
employer’s control”).168
In sum, O’Connor provides five important lessons for searches by
government employers. First, O’Connor established that public employees
may reasonably expect privacy in the workplace, depending on the
workplace’s unique circumstances.169 Second, O’Connor created the
workplace exception to the warrant requirement, under which Fourth
Amendment claims of public employees will often depend on whether the
employer’s actions were reasonable at the inception and reasonable in scope,
rather than whether probable cause exists or a warrant is obtained.170 Third,
for a search to be reasonable at its inception, the employer must have
“reasonable suspicion”171 to believe either that the search will turn up
evidence of work-related misconduct, such as a suspected company theft, or
“that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose
such as to retrieve a needed file” from an employee’s office.172 Fourth, to be
reasonable in scope, the employer’s search must not be “excessively
intrusive” in light of the underlying justification for the search.173 Finally,
not every employer intrusion will fall within the scope of the workplace
exception, as some items will not be within “the boundaries of the workplace
context” if they are not sufficiently “related to work and . . . generally within
the employer’s control.”174

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 716.
Id.
Id. at 715–16.
Id. at 715–17.
Id. at 725–26.
Id. at 724; see also supra note 157.
O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726.
Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)).
Id. at 715–16.
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C. Step Three: Determining the Appropriate Remedy for a Fourth
Amendment Violation
If the court finds that an unreasonable Fourth Amendment search or
seizure has occurred, the court will then determine the appropriate remedy
for the constitutional violation. In the criminal prosecution context, the usual
remedy is exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of the Fourth
Amendment violation.175 Exclusion of evidence might also be appropriate in
employee disciplinary proceedings.176 But more commonly, in a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 civil suit based on an alleged Fourth Amendment violation by an
employer, the usual remedy is money damages for the employee whose
Fourth Amendment rights were violated.177
III. GPS TRACKING BY PUBLIC EMPLOYERS: LESSONS FROM RECENT
CASES
Before COVID-19, employers used GPS tracking devices to investigate
allegations of employee misconduct.178 GPS tracking technology was also
used for noninvestigatory work-related reasons, such as to collect regulatory
information or to improve efficiency of operations.179 Two recent cases from
New York illustrate these distinct forms of GPS tracking. These cases are
significant because they reach opposite results on the lawfulness of employee
tracking and illustrate the types of factors courts will consider when deciding
the constitutionality of contact tracing through cell phone apps and wearable
devices.
In the first case, Cunningham v. New York State Department of Labor,180
the Court of Appeals of New York examined an instance of GPS tracking
conducted as part of an employee misconduct investigation by a New York
state employer.181 In 2008, to investigate its suspicion that employee Michael
Cunningham was submitting false time sheets and taking unauthorized
absences from work, the New York State Department of Labor (“the
Department”) attached a GPS device to Cunningham’s car, without his

175. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
176. See, e.g., Cunningham v. N.Y. Dep’t of Lab. (Cunningham I), 933 N.Y.S.2d 432, 435 (App.
Div. 2011) (applying the exclusionary rule in an employee disciplinary proceeding), rev’d, 997
N.E.2d 468 (N.Y. 2013).
177. See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(noting that a plaintiff-employee was awarded $108,000 in damages for an invasion of privacy by
her employer).
178. See infra notes 180–195 and accompanying text (discussing Cunningham I).
179. See infra notes 196–214 and accompanying text (discussing Carniol).
180. Cunningham I, 933 N.Y.S.2d 432.
181. Cunningham II, 997 N.E.2d 468, 470–71, 475 (N.Y. 2013).
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knowledge, while the car was parked in a lot near the Department’s offices.182
The device was then used to track the vehicle’s movements for thirty days,
including evenings, weekends, and several days when Cunningham was on
vacation in another state.183 GPS information showed that Cunningham’s
arrival and departure times from work were inconsistent with the number of
hours he claimed on his time sheets.184 The Department then brought thirteen
charges of misconduct against Cunningham, eight of which were dependent
on GPS evidence.185 The Hearing Officer overseeing Cunningham’s
administrative proceeding sustained eleven of the thirteen charges and
recommended termination of Cunningham’s employment, which occurred
shortly thereafter.186
Cunningham later sought to overturn his termination on the grounds that
the GPS data used against him should have been suppressed as the fruit of a
Fourth Amendment violation.187 Applying the physical trespass test, the
court first held that the GPS tracking of Cunningham’s vehicle was a search
under the Fourth Amendment.188 The court then considered whether the
warrantless search was reasonable under the O’Connor workplace exception.
Applying O’Connor, the court deemed the search justified at its
inception because Cunningham’s employer had “ample grounds to suspect
him of submitting false time records.”189 The court deemed the search
unreasonable in scope, however, as it involved “excessively intrusive,”
round-the-clock surveillance of Cunningham’s vehicle,190 which
encompassed “much activity with which the State had no legitimate
concern—i.e., it tracked [Cunningham] on all evenings, on all weekends and
on vacation,” capturing a great deal of purely private activity.191
Finally, the court addressed whether suppression of GPS data obtained
during normal business hours was necessary since no evidence obtained from
surveillance conducted outside of business hours was used against
Cunningham.192 Finding all GPS tracking data inadmissible, the court
reasoned:

182. Id. at 470.
183. Id. at 470–71, 475.
184. Id. at 470–71.
185. Id.; see also Cunningham I, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
186. Cunningham I, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
187. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Cunningham v. N.Y. Dep’t of Lab., 997 N.E.2d 468 (N.Y. 2013)
(No. 2013-0123).
188. Cunningham II, 997 N.E.2d at 471.
189. Id. at 473.
190. Id. (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987)).
191. Id.
192. Id.
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Ordinarily, when a search has exceeded its permissible scope, the
suppression of items found during the permissible portion of the
search is not required. But we hold that rule to be inapplicable to
GPS searches like the present one, in light of the extraordinary
capacity of a GPS device to permit “[c]onstant, relentless tracking
of anything.” Where an employer conducts a GPS search without
making a reasonable effort to avoid tracking an employee outside
of business hours, the search as a whole must be considered
unreasonable. That conclusion concededly requires suppression of
[all] GPS evidence here . . . .193
Although Cunningham involved an employee misconduct
investigation—a context distinct from the wholesale tracking of an entire
segment of employees for noninvestigatory, business-related reasons—
Cunningham is relevant for employers implementing more wholesale forms
of employee tracking, such as contact tracing. As the quoted passage above
shows, Cunningham reveals that when employers make no reasonable effort
to avoid tracking an employee outside of business hours, the surveillance as
a whole might be deemed unreasonable, leading to potential liability and
money damages against the employer in a Fourth Amendment lawsuit.194
Accordingly, if an employer conducts contact tracing through the more
robust forms of contact tracing technologies described in Part I, such as GPSbased apps that capture detailed location data, the employer could face
liability under the Fourth Amendment, suggesting that such contact tracing
methods should be avoided.195
A second New York case, Carniol v. New York City Taxi and Limousine
Commission,196 is more directly analogous to contact tracing of an entire
group of employees, as the case involved a Fourth Amendment challenge to
an employer’s tracking of an entire segment of employees for
noninvestigatory reasons.197 The events leading to this case began when the
New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (“TLC”) mandated that all
New York City medallion taxi cabs be equipped with GPS technology.198 As
originally developed, the TLC’s intent was to gather data regarding pick-up
and drop-off points, to assess trip time and distance, to eliminate the need for

193. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433,
441 (2009)).
194. See supra Section II.C.
195. See supra Section I.B.1 (describing the South Korea app as an example). For these reasons,
employers should avoid tracing technologies that would operate through RFID chips implanted in
employees’ bodies, as such technologies would clearly constitute a search under Jones and would
likely be deemed excessively intrusive under O’Connor.
196. 975 N.Y.S.2d 842 (Sup. Ct. 2013), aff’d, 126 A.D.3d 409 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
197. Id. at 844–45.
198. Id. at 844.
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drivers to complete handwritten trip sheets, and to assist in locating a
passenger’s lost property.199
With its administrative purposes in mind, the TLC did not plan to use
the GPS system for investigatory purposes.200 Yet, after receiving complaints
that passengers were being overcharged, the TLC reviewed the data
generated by the GPS system for essentially all of its 42,000 cab drivers,
including Carniol.201 After determining that Carniol had overcharged
passengers ninety-one times, the TLC commenced an administrative
proceeding against him, which resulted in the revocation of his TLC
license.202
Carniol subsequently challenged the revocation, arguing that the TLC’s
use of GPS tracking violated his Fourth Amendment rights.203 Under the first
step of Fourth Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court for New York
County ruled that Carniol could not legitimately expect privacy in the trip
data gathered by GPS because the taxicab industry is heavily regulated and
the GPS information was collected in furtherance of those regulations.204
Assuming Carniol could expect privacy, however, the court went on to find
that the TLC’s GPS tracking program would have been reasonable in light of
the competing interests at stake.205
According to the court, Carniol’s “privacy interest” in the GPSgenerated trip data was “minimal,” and the “intrusion [was] also minimal,”
as “it [did] not involve a physical intrusion into Carniol’s body or home” and
did not collect data regarding his off-duty whereabouts.206 On the other side
of the scale, the government’s interests in improving customer service and in
regulating using “modern methods to promote passenger and driver safety”
were “substantial.”207 The court further noted that the GPS monitoring was
conducted with the knowledge and consent of the taxi driver and “was
narrowly tailored to achieve a regulatory goal.”208 Accordingly, even if
Carniol could legitimately expect privacy in the GPS data, the search would
have been reasonable.209
For purposes of the instant analysis, five things are noteworthy about
Carniol. First, because the GPS system at issue was installed with the
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 844–45.
See id. at 845.
Id.
Id. at 845–46.
Id. at 846.
Id. at 848.
Id. at 848–49.
Id. at 849 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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knowledge and consent of the City’s taxi drivers, the use of that system was
not governed by Jones, leaving only the question of whether a Fourth
Amendment search occurred under the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy test.210 Second, taxi drivers subject to GPS monitoring could not
reasonably expect privacy under Katz, at least in part because of their
consent.211 Third, that same consent contributed to the court’s ultimate
determination that the employer’s wholesale GPS monitoring of its taxi
drivers was reasonable.212 Fourth, the legitimate government interests at
issue—to regulate and improve the taxi industry through modern methods
that better protect passenger and driver safety—tilted the scale of
reasonableness in the employer’s direction.213 Finally, the fact that no data
was collected regarding Carniol’s off-duty whereabouts made the GPS
surveillance relatively unintrusive as compared to Cunningham.214
When examining how Cunningham and Carniol might impact the more
recent contact tracing technologies described in Part I, including contact
tracing apps and wearable devices, it is important to consider the key
differences between Carniol and Cunningham that generated opposite Fourth
Amendment outcomes. Unlike Cunningham, the GPS tracking conducted in
Carniol was done with employee consent, the employees in Carniol were not
tracked while off-duty and away from work, and the legitimate employer
interest of improving passenger and driver safety made the GPS tracking in
Carniol even more reasonable. As the next Part shows, these same key
ingredients—consent, limited scope, and legitimate employer interest—will
help ensure that an employer’s contact tracing program survives Fourth
Amendment scrutiny.
IV. EMPLOYER CONTACT TRACING: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUES
There is currently no federal law that directly prohibits public
employers from using contact tracing apps, wearables, and similar devices to
track the movements of employees.215 Certain state laws, however, could
210. See id.; see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012) (recognizing that
“[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain
subject to Katz analysis”) (emphasis omitted).
211. Carniol, 975 N.Y.S.2d at 848 (emphasizing that the taxicab industry is heavily regulated,
which reduces expectations of privacy, and that “the TTS system was installed with the knowledge
of the taxicab owners and all taxicab drivers are required to follow TLC regulations which mandate
the use of the TTS system”).
212. See id.
213. See id. at 849.
214. See id.
215. Hoffman & Litchfield, supra note 1; Ramjee et al., supra note 21. In 2020, Congress
proposed legislation on contact tracing, but thus far those bills have not been enacted into law. See
Exposure Notification Privacy Act, S. 3861, 116th Cong. § 8 (2020) (introduced on June 1, 2020);
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potentially impact employer use of such technologies.216 More generally,
public employers must ensure that such technologies comply with the Fourth
Amendment, which requires consideration of the following issues:
• If employees consent to contact tracing by their employer, is
their consent valid?
• If employee consent is presumed coerced and therefore invalid,
what is the likelihood that a Fourth Amendment claim could
materialize? Stated differently, would employer use of contact
tracing technologies amount to a Fourth Amendment search or
seizure?
• Assuming the Fourth Amendment applies, would the O’Connor
workplace exception permit the employer’s chosen contact
tracing program?
• If the business justification for contact tracing is securing the
health and safety of employees and others in the workplace,
what is the permissible scope of such tracing?
• What does the permissible scope teach employers about which
tracing technologies are most defensible under the Fourth
Amendment?
• Would the current U.S. Supreme Court view widespread
contact tracing by employers as a problematic version of
suspicionless mass surveillance?
This Part examines these issues. For purposes of the instant analysis,
this Part focuses on the more common types of contact tracing methods used
by American employers today as outlined in Sections I.B.2 and I.C—i.e.,
contact tracing using cell phone Bluetooth data, and contact tracing
accomplished through wearable devices that also primarily rely on Bluetooth.
Because most employers today are not attempting to contact trace through
GPS tracking devices or through a phone’s internal GPS (described in
Sections I.A and I.B.1), both of which raise great privacy concerns, this Part
does not directly address the lawfulness of those surveillance methods.217

COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3663, 116th Cong. (2020) (introduced on
May 7, 2020); Public Health Emergency Privacy Act, S. 3749, 116th Cong. (2020) (introduced on
May 14, 2020).
216. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7(a), (d) (West 1998) (stating that “[n]o person or entity
in this state shall use an electronic tracking device to determine the location or movement of a
person,” and defining “electronic tracking device” as “any device attached to a vehicle or other
movable thing that reveals its location or movement by the transmission of electronic signals”).
Under the California statute, some of the wearable devices described in Section I.C might be
considered an “electronic tracking device.” See also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/21-2.5 (West
2014) (generally prohibiting persons in Illinois from using an electronic tracking device to
determine the location or movement of a person, with an exception for consent, among others).
217. See supra notes 33–44 and accompanying text.
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A. Validity of Consent
Recall that the first step in any Fourth Amendment claim is to determine
whether a search or seizure has occurred, and the second step is to determine
whether such action, assuming one occurred, was reasonable.218 Under either
of these steps, employee consent can play a critical role.219 Accordingly, it
makes sense to first examine the issue of consent.
If employees consent to contact tracing by their employer, the question
becomes whether that consent is valid. Under Fourth Amendment
precedents, for consent to be valid, it must be freely and voluntarily given,
rather than coerced.220 As articulated by the Supreme Court, “the question
whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of
duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined
from the totality of all the circumstances.”221 In addition, to be valid,
“consent [must be] a product of th[e] individual’s free and unconstrained
choice, rather than a mere acquiescence [to] a show of authority.”222 In the
employment context, if an employee is required to submit to a search or
seizure as a condition of continued employment, the employee’s consent to
that action might be considered coerced.223
One example of coerced consent in the employment context occurred in
Port Authority Police Benevolent Ass’n v. Port Authority of New York & New
Jersey.224 In that case, a group of employees sued their employer, the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey (“Port Authority”), for allegedly
violating their Fourth Amendment rights by searching their personal cell
phones.225 The events leading to that search began when a class of the Port
218. See supra Section II.A; see also United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 399–401 (4th Cir.
2000) (analyzing these two steps in the context of a search of an employee’s office at work).
219. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing the role of consent in Carniol); see
also supra note 133 (providing case examples involving employee consent). Of course, along with
the workplace exception to the warrant requirement, there is also a consent exception that could be
invoked in employment cases.
220. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).
221. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
222. Anobile v. Pelligrino, 303 F.3d 107, 124 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Garcia,
56 F.3d 418, 422 (2d Cir. 1995)); Bumper, 391 U.S. at 549.
223. See Sabin v. Miller, 423 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (finding genuine issues of
material fact as to whether an employee’s consent was the result of duress or coercion when the
employee’s supervisor told her that an investigator was going to talk with her, that she should
“cooperate completely” with the investigator, and that, “[e]verything will be all right, as long as you
do what they tell you to do” (alteration in original)). See generally Carr v. Mulhearn, 601 A.2d 946,
949 (R.I. 1992) (discussing the “more subtle forms of coercion in the workplace that sometimes
blur the line between voluntariness and compulsion”).
224. No. 15-CV-3526, 2017 WL 4403310 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017).
225. Plaintiffs also sued certain individuals involved in the cell phone searches, but the district
court dismissed those claims on the basis of qualified immunity. Port Auth. Police Benevolent
Ass’n, 2017 WL 4403310, at *1.
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Authority Police Department (“PAPD”) graduated from police academy
training as Probationary Police Officers (“PPOs”), making their employment
easily terminable.226 The following day, many of these PPOs attended a postgraduation party at the Texas Arizona Bar & Grill, which became rowdy and
disruptive.227
The next morning, Lieutenant Timothy McGovern opened a police
misconduct investigation (“PIU”) into those events with the goal of
interviewing all PPOs who attended the party.228 Before conducting
interviews, McGovern warned PPOs that they “were required to cooperate in
an investigation” and “could face termination” if they did not.229 On the first
day of PPO interviews, McGovern learned that PPOs who attended the party
used a cell phone application called GroupMe to communicate with one
another about the party.230 For PPOs that participated in these GroupMe
chats, McGovern instructed investigators to request to view those
messages.231 Before each interview, PPOs were again informed they had to
“cooperate in this investigation,”232 and were not informed they had the right
to refuse the cell phone search.233 As a result, many of the PPOs understood
that they had no choice but to consent to the search and believed they would
be fired if they did not.234
After investigators reviewed the contents of thirty-six employees’
personal cell phones,235 PPOs sued their employer and various individuals
involved in the search alleging their phones had been unreasonably searched
and seized under the Fourth Amendment.236 Defendants first sought to justify
their warrantless cell phone searches under the O’Connor v. Ortega
workplace exception, which permits certain warrantless searches by
employers that are reasonable at the outset and in scope.237 District Court

226. Id. at *2 (stating that “because the PPOs were probationary employees, all of them could
have . . . been fired for any non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory reason”).
227. Id. at *1. At that party, PPOs reportedly damaged property, stole beer, touched other
patrons inappropriately, and fought with a bouncer, who described the evening as “the ‘worst night’
he had ‘ever worked.’” Id.
228. Id. at *1–2.
229. Id. at *2.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at *3. “Interview transcripts reveal that during [at least] thirty-three of those interviews,
PPOs were given the opportunity to speak with their union representative before acceding to the
search.” Id. at *2.
233. Id. at *3.
234. See id. (summarizing testimony of various PPOs on this point).
235. Id. at *2. The Port Authority did not own any of the phones, did not pay for them, and did
not pay for the cellular service. Id. at *3.
236. Id.
237. 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987).
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Judge Kimba Wood rejected this argument, however, because the PPOs’
“purely personal” cell phones were not within the “workplace context” as
articulated in O’Connor.238 Rather, like employees’ homes, the PPOs’
personal cell phones were not “related to work and . . . [not] generally within
the employer’s control.”239 Moreover, like the closed “handbag or briefcase”
mentioned in O’Connor, the PPOs did not relinquish their legitimate
expectation of privacy in the contents of their personally-owned cell
phones.240 Accordingly, the O’Connor exception did not allow their
warrantless inspection.241
Judge Wood then rejected the defendants’ second defense based on the
PPOs purported consent.242 As Judge Wood noted, to be valid, consent must
“not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert
force.”243 And in the employment context, “[c]oercion may be found where
one is given a choice between one’s employment and one’s constitutional
rights.”244 Applying these principles, Judge Wood concluded that a
reasonable jury could find that the PPOs’ acquiescence was coerced.245
Indeed, PPOs were told they could be fired if they did not cooperate with the
investigation, causing them to believe that they must consent to the search to
retain their jobs.246 With no applicable warrant exception, Judge Wood thus
concluded that “a warrant was required before initiating the searches.”247
Under cases like Port Authority, if an employee is forced to choose
between losing their job and accepting a condition of continued employment,
such as submitting to a cell phone search, the employee’s consent might be
deemed coerced.248 If an employee is faced with a similar ultimatum of either
participating in an employer’s contact tracing program or being terminated,
it is possible that an employee’s consent to such surveillance might likewise
be deemed coerced, leaving the O’Connor workplace exception as the only
potential justification for such surveillance, an issue discussed below in
Section V.C.

238. Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 2017 WL 4403310, at *5 (citations omitted).
239. Id. at *4 (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715).
240. See id. at *4–5 (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 716).
241. Id.
242. Id. at *6.
243. Id. at *5 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973)).
244. Id. (quoting Anobile v. Pelligrino, 303 F.3d 107, 124 (2d Cir. 2002)).
245. Id. at *6.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See id. at *5; see also Sabin v. Miller, 423 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949 (S.D. Iowa 2006)
(recognizing that “[t]he state may not coerce its employees ‘into relinquishing a constitutional
guarantee under threat of losing their employment’” (quoting Lesher v. Reed, 12 F.3d 148, 150 (8th
Cir. 1994))).
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Before turning to that analysis, it is important to recognize that the more
employee-friendly view of consent as espoused in Port Authority might not
carry the day. Indeed, recent Supreme Court precedent reveals that in some
instances when an employer has imposed a term of employment upon its
workers as a condition of continued employment, the workers’ consent to that
term of employment is not necessarily coerced. Simply put, because the
workers could reject the term of employment and look for work elsewhere,
their acceptance of that term constitutes adequate “consent.”249
This more employer-friendly view of consent finds support in a recent
Supreme Court opinion, Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela.250 In that case, an
employee of Lamps Plus, Inc., Frank Varela, brought a putative class action
lawsuit against his employer after a hacker obtained the tax information of
hundreds of employees and filed a fraudulent tax return in Varela’s name.251
Like most Lamps Plus employees, Varela had signed an arbitration
agreement when he started work at the company, one that was ambiguous
with regards to whether class-wide arbitration was permissible.252
Nevertheless, Varela brought claims on behalf of a putative class of
employees whose tax information had been compromised by suing Lamps
Plus in federal court.253 Lamps Plus then moved to compel arbitration on an
individual rather than class-wide basis, and to dismiss the lawsuit.254
Finding that Varela must arbitrate his claims individually, the Supreme
Court declared that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) generally envisions
individualized arbitration (as a default rule), rather than class arbitration.255
The Court emphasized, however, that “[a]rbitration is strictly a matter of
consent,” such that courts must enforce whatever terms of arbitration the
parties agree upon.256 Because it was unclear whether the parties truly
intended to permit class arbitration, which lacks the benefits of the default
position of individual arbitration, the Court was unable to conclude that the
parties actually agreed to arbitrate their disputes on a class-wide basis.257
Most importantly, the Lamps Plus Court acknowledged that the
employer drafted the arbitration agreement and imposed the agreement on its

249. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Consent, Coercion, and Employment Law, 55 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV.
LIBERTIES L. REV. 409, 418 (2020).
250. 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
251. Id. at 1412.
252. See id. at 1413.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1415. See also id. at 1418–19.
256. Id. at 1415 (alteration in original) (quoting Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287,
299 (2010)).
257. Id. at 1415–16.
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workers as a condition of continued employment.258 Nevertheless, the Court
concluded that both parties had freely entered into the agreement, which had
to be upheld as written because of their mutual consent.259 Simply put, even
though the employees had no real say in the disputed terms, and even though
the terms were clearly unfavorable to the employees, the Court viewed those
terms to reflect the intent of both parties.260
For the instant analysis, Lamps Plus reveals that in some instances the
Court will find that employees have validly consented to a term of
employment imposed by their employer simply by choosing to remain
employed under that term of employment.261 After all, the employees in
Lamps Plus willingly accepted their employer’s arbitration provision by
signing the provision and remaining employed, rather than seeking
employment elsewhere.262 If this principle were applied to employerimposed contact tracing methods, then the same type of “consent” might
override any Fourth Amendment challenge to contact tracing at work.
Indeed, if an employee has consented to a search or seizure, the employee
cannot typically expect privacy in that instance and the employer’s action
would generally not be unreasonable, thereby defeating any Fourth
Amendment claim against that employer.263

258. Id. See also id. at 1430 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (acknowledging, along with Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, that Lamps Plus drafted the arbitration agreement at issue and
had the opportunity to insert language expressly barring class arbitration if that was its intent).
259. See id. at 1415–17 (majority opinion) (finding that ambiguity in an arbitration provision
does not provide a sufficient basis for concluding that the parties to the agreement agreed to
undermine the central benefits of arbitration itself, including arbitration on an individual, rather than
a class-wide, basis).
260. See id. at 1416 (emphasizing the importance of “giv[ing] effect to the intent of the parties”
(quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010))). See id. at
1421–22 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding “irony” in the majority’s reliance on mutual consent in
upholding a term of employment that is clearly unfavorable to the employee even though the
employee had no real power to bargain for different terms).
261. Another recent Supreme Court case that arguably supports this view of consent is Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). In Epic Systems, the parties had entered into a
contract providing for individualized arbitration proceedings to resolve any employment disputes
between them. Id. at 1619–20. Each employee nevertheless sought to litigate their claims through
class or collective actions in federal court. Id. at 1620. The employees argued that their agreements’
requirement of individualized proceedings should be set aside as violative of the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA”). Id. at 1622. Although the employers in Epic Systems had required their
employees to sign the arbitration agreements as a condition of continued employment, id. at 1633
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting), the Court refused to strike down those agreements, in part due to the
employees’ consent. See id. at 1619 (majority opinion).
262. See Bagenstos, supra note 249, at 419.
263. See supra note 133 (containing case examples involving consent).
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B. Step One: Fourth Amendment Threshold Issues
Although it is possible that employee consent to an employer’s contact
tracing program might be deemed coerced under precedents like Port
Authority, this does not end the Fourth Amendment inquiry. Rather, one
must still determine whether a Fourth Amendment “search” or “seizure” has
occurred, including (1) whether the employee could otherwise reasonably
expect privacy in the case at hand (the primary search test);264 (2) whether
the employer has sought to obtain information by physically intruding on a
person, house, paper, or effect (the alternative search test);265 (3) whether
contact tracing programs amount to a seizure of the employee (under the law
that governs seizures of persons);266 and (4) whether there has been a
meaningful interference with the employee’s possessory interest in a device
used to facilitate contact tracing, such as a personal cell phone, or in the
underlying contact tracing data (the relevant seizure test for effects).267 If any
of those threshold tests are met, the Fourth Amendment is at play, at which
point one must still determine whether the underlying search or seizure was
reasonable. This Section examines these threshold issues.
1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Search Test
Regarding whether a “search” occurs when an employer utilizes a
system of contact tracing through cell phone apps or other wearable devices,
the question becomes whether employees may legitimately expect privacy in
their movements and interactions with one another while at work. Based on
video surveillance cases, the answer to that question is likely no.
Although video surveillance by employers takes many forms, the most
analogous form of surveillance to the contact tracing technologies at issue is
video surveillance in open office spaces, such as break rooms and common
areas, where concerns of close or extended employee interactions would be
heightened.268 When video surveillance has been conducted in open office
spaces, courts have generally permitted the surveillance based on the fact that
it would be unreasonable for employees to assume that anything occurring in
these areas would be private.269 This is especially true when the cameras are
264. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 143–144 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 124–126 and accompanying text.
268. Compare Acosta v. Scott Lab., LLC, 377 F. Supp. 2d 647 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (involving video
surveillance in open spaces), with Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177 (Iowa 2011) (involving a
hidden video camera the employer placed in the female employees’ restroom).
269. See, e.g., Acosta, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 650 (recognizing that “[p]ersons cannot reasonably
maintain an expectation of privacy in that which they display openly,” regardless of “whether the
observation of openly displayed facts is accomplished by a video camera or the naked eye” (quoting
Vega-Rodriguez v. P.R. Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 181 (1st Cir. 1997))). See generally Katz v. United

988

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:951

positioned in plain view (making the surveillance open and obvious), when
employees have consented to the surveillance, and when the employer has a
legitimate business justification for the recording.270
One example is Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co.,271 where
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found it “implausible
to suggest that society would recognize as reasonable an employee’s
expectation of privacy against being viewed . . . in the [employer’s] open and
undifferentiated work area.”272 In upholding this instance of video
surveillance, the First Circuit also noted that the employer had a legitimate
business interest for conducting the surveillance, and that the employer acted
overtly by notifying its employees in advance that cameras would be installed
and disclosing the cameras’ field of vision.273 According to the First Circuit,
“[w]hen all is said and done, employees must accept some circumscription
of their liberty as a condition of continued employment.”274
Of course, one key difference between video surveillance in open areas
and the contact tracing technologies discussed in Part I that utilize Bluetooth
or similar technology is the ability of those technologies to capture data
regarding the interactions of employees in all parts of the workplace,
including private areas such as restrooms.275 In the context of video
surveillance, this distinction can make a difference.276 Nevertheless, video
surveillance in private areas is problematic precisely because it permits a
view of the plaintiff in his or her private activities. This is not the case with
contact tracing apps or wearables, which typically only capture data
regarding employee interactions by recording their proximity and time spent
interacting.277
Along with these video surveillance precedents, the contact tracing
technologies described in Part I that rely on Bluetooth or Wi-Fi do not require
access to the contents of an employee’s cell phone, for which expectations of
privacy are heightened.278 As noted in Port Authority and similar cases,
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”).
270. See, e.g., Vega-Rodriguez v. P.R. Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174 (1st Cir. 1997).
271. 110 F.3d 174 (1st Cir. 1997).
272. Id. at 180.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Cf. id. at 181 (finding it significant that the employer’s video cameras “do not pry behind
closed office doors or into desks, drawers, file cabinets, or other enclosed spaces, but, rather, record
only what is plainly visible on the surface”).
276. See Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177, 182–84 (Iowa 2011) (discussing tort of intrusion
cases involving secret videotaping of employees in private areas, such as restrooms).
277. See supra notes 49–57 (discussing the PwC contact tracing app).
278. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393–98 (2014). Fourth Amendment law generally
recognizes a distinction between the contents of a communication (such as GroupMe chats) and the
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employees generally have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents
of their personally-owned cell phones.279 Importantly, however, when an
employer implements contact tracing through a cell phone app, this generally
does not require the employer to search or otherwise access the contents of
any employee-owned device, making the tracing less invasive.280 The PwC
tracing device, for example, simply requires workers to authorize contact
tracing through an app on their cell phone.281 Once installed, the PwC app
runs in the background throughout the day and uses Bluetooth and Wi-Fi data
to determine employees’ proximity to one another and the amount of time
employees spend interacting.282 As a result, an employer’s implementation
of a contact tracing app would likely not infringe any reasonable expectation
of privacy. For similar reasons, there could be no reasonable expectation of
privacy in wearable contact tracing devices provided by an employer for the
sole purpose of contact tracing because, unlike other wearable smart devices
like fitness activity trackers, such contact tracing devices do not contain
protected private information.283
In addition, unlike the GPS data and cell site location information
(“CSLI”) at issue in cases like Jones and Carpenter v. United States,284
addressing information associated with that communication (such as to whom a chat is directed).
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–43 (1979). In the employment context, courts have
recognized that it is generally more invasive to access the contents of employee communications,
such as text messages, as opposed to a list of numbers and names with which a person has
communicated. See, e.g., McGreal v. AT&T Corp., 892 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1015 (N.D. Ill. 2012)
(distinguishing between the contents of plaintiff’s phone calls or text messages, which would be
“extremely personal,” and “[a] bare list of phone numbers,” which “is not sufficiently private to
meet the elements of an intrusion upon seclusion claim”); Cunningham v. Terrebonne Par. Consol.
Gov’t, No. 09-8046, 2011 WL 651997, at *2, *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 11, 2011) (rejecting summary
judgment for employee on his Fourth Amendment claim due to genuine issues of fact as to whether
the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell phone records containing only
numbers dialed and received, but not names or substance); Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Victor, 43 F.
Supp. 3d 1026, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“This and other courts have concluded that there is no
‘legally protected privacy interest and reasonable expectation of privacy’ in electronic messages,
‘in general.’ Rather, a privacy interest can exist, if at all, only with respect to the content of those
communications.” (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted)).
279. See Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n v. Port. Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 15-CV-3526,
2017 WL 4403310, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017) (discussing the impact on public employers of
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014)); Hibbert v. Schmitz, No. 3:16-CV-3028, 2017 WL 59075,
at *5–6 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2017) (finding employee’s complaint sufficiently alleged a search under
the Fourth Amendment based on her employer’s act of copying the personal information on her
iPhone).
280. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
281. Putzier & Cutter, supra note 3.
282. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
283. See Katharine Saphner, You Should Be Free to Talk the Talk and Walk the Walk: Applying
Riley v. California to Smart Activity Trackers, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1689, 1691–92, 1706–10 (2016)
(applying Riley v. California to data from smart wearable technology, such as activity trackers, and
arguing that such digital data should generally be protected by the warrant requirement).
284. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
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contact tracing apps and wearable contact tracing devices do not generate
detailed location information, but instead only capture data regarding relative
proximity to other devices, which is naturally less invasive.285 Finally, as the
Supreme Court has ruled in numerous cases, “a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties.”286 Under this doctrine, an employee who voluntarily turns over
location data to his or her employer for the limited purpose of contact tracing
would no longer have any expectation of privacy in that data, at least vis-àvis the employer.
2. Physical Trespass Search Test
As an alternative to the Katz test, courts sometimes apply the physical
trespass test to determine whether a Fourth Amendment “search” has
occurred.287 Under this test, a Fourth Amendment “search” occurs,
irrespective of the Katz test, when the government physically trespasses on
“persons, houses, papers, and effects” to obtain information.288 Such a
trespass occurs when a government agent, without consent, encroaches on an
area or object protected by the Fourth Amendment, such as a person’s vehicle
or home, in order to find something or obtain information.289
Although an individual’s personally-owned cell phone is undoubtedly
an “effect” under the Fourth Amendment,290 the physical trespass “search”
test seemingly does not apply to the types of cell phone app-based contact
tracing technologies described in Section I.B.2. For one, most employees
who permit contact tracing through apps like the PwC app do so only after
voluntarily consenting to that action, and there is no physical trespass in that

285. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(recognizing that “GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations”); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211, 2216 (emphasizing that the CSLI data at issue
“provide[d] a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements,” and stating that the “[m]uch
like GPS tracking of a vehicle, cell phone location information is detailed, encyclopedic, and
effortlessly compiled”).
286. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979)).
287. See supra notes 141–143 and accompanying text.
288. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Jones, 565 U.S. at 406–07, 407 n.3; see also Florida v. Jardines,
569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013); State v. Jean, 407 P.3d 524, 528 (Ariz. 2018).
289. Jones, 565 U.S. at 410; Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11; id. at 7–10 (discussing the lack of consent
by Jardines).
290. Cf. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (“It is beyond dispute that a vehicle is an ‘effect’ as that term is
used in the [Fourth] Amendment.”).

2022]

CONTACT TRACING

991

instance.291 But even assuming that such consent is coerced, the lack of any
physical intrusion likely rules out the physical trespass test.292
As originally understood, the Fourth Amendment did not apply in the
absence of a physical intrusion—a trespass—upon a constitutionally
protected area.293 And as the United States Supreme Court more recently
noted in Jones and in Florida v. Jardines,294 there must be an actual physical
intrusion upon an individual’s person, house, paper, or effect for a Fourth
Amendment search to occur under this alternative search test.295 In Jones,
for example, police physically mounted a GPS receiver on the defendant’s
automobile, thus intruding on his “effect.”296 In Jardines, police physically
intruded on Jardines’ constitutionally protected property (his house) in order
to gather evidence against him in a criminal investigation.297 Here, by
contrast, when an employee downloads an app to his or her cell phone, no
such physical intrusion occurs.298
291. See id. at 408–10 (discussing the effect of consent upon a Fourth Amendment physical
trespass claim); see, e.g., El-Nahal v. Yassky, 993 F. Supp. 2d 460, 467–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(finding no common law trespass and refusing to apply Jones to an employer’s installation of a GPS
tracking system in taxicabs), aff’d, 835 F.3d 248 (2d Cir. 2016); State v. Malloy, No. 20190446,
2021 WL 209290, at *5 (Utah 2021) (“A trespass is an unconsented physical ‘intrusion’ on a
person’s property. Such intrusion is effected when a police officer physically touches or impacts
another person’s property, as with the attachment of a GPS device to a car, or even ‘an officer’s
momentary reaching into the interior of a vehicle.’ There is no trespass, however, where the
intrusion on property is effected through the consent or invitation of the property owner.” (footnote
omitted)).
292. Cf. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7–10 (discussing Jardines’ lack of consent).
293. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (holding no Fourth Amendment
“search” occurred under the physical trespass test when officers used wiretaps installed on telephone
lines outside Olmstead’s property to intercept telephone conversations occurring inside because
“[t]here was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants”), overruled in part by Berger v.
State, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427, 438–39 (1963) (describing the Supreme Court’s physical trespass cases involving
electronic eavesdropping as “insist[ing] only that the electronic device not be planted by an unlawful
physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area”).
294. 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
295. Jones, 565 U.S. at 407 (reaffirming the principle “that, when the Government does engage
in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion
may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983)); Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11 (“That the officers learned what they
learned only by physically intruding on Jardines’ property to gather evidence is enough to establish
that a search occurred.”); see also State v. Phillips, 382 P.3d 133, 149 (Haw. 2016) (recognizing
that “[u]nder the Jones/Jardines trespass-intrusion test, the first question is whether there is a
trespass or physical intrusion to persons, houses, papers, or effects. A physical intrusion is the act
of ‘entering without permission’” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 951 (10th ed. 2014)).
296. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 403 (explaining that “agents installed a GPS tracking device on the
undercarriage of the Jeep while it was parked in a public parking lot”).
297. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11.
298. As explained, the Jones trespass doctrine would not apply unless the contact tracing app
itself would be considered physically intrusive of the device. This is doubtful in light of the Jones
Court’s statement that “[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without
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In the event an employee is compelled by her employer to don a
wearable tracking device, such as a wearable GPS-enabled necklace, the case
more closely resembles Jones.299 In Jones, acting without a valid warrant,
police officers surreptitiously attached a GPS tracking device to the
undercarriage of suspect Antoine Jones’s vehicle and used the device to track
the vehicle for twenty-eight days.300 In doing so without Jones’s consent, the
officers “physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining
information,” constituting a Fourth Amendment “search.”301
In Jones, the Court emphasized that “[b]y attaching the device to the
Jeep, officers encroached on a [constitutionally] protected area.”302 By
analogy, if an employer attempts to collect location information by
“attaching” a tracing device to an employee’s “person”—a constitutionally
protected area—a Fourth Amendment search would arguably occur.303 If

trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.” 565 U.S. at 411 (emphasis omitted). Of course,
one might argue that if an employer coerces its employees into downloading and activating the app,
a physical trespass of the device might occur. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Path, Inc., No. 12-CV-01515
YGR, 2012 WL 5194120, at *2, *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2012) (applying California trespass law
and suggesting that a trespass to chattels might occur when a cell phone user downloads an app that
is then used in a manner that exceeds the scope of the user’s consent, but dismissing the claim
because plaintiffs alleged the unauthorized action caused “depletion of ‘two to three seconds of
battery capacity,’” a de minimis injury). It is perhaps for this reason that Minnesota Law School
Professor Alan Z. Rozenshtein has argued that “any government surveillance program that required
individuals to download an app on their phones might constitute a Fourth Amendment search under
the trespass test, since it would interfere in individuals’ property interests—that is, to control what
is on their devices.” Rozenshtein, supra note 34. This view of trespass finds some support in the
case law. See, e.g., In re Apple & AT & TM Antitrust Litig., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1306–07 (N.D.
Cal. 2008) (refusing to dismiss a trespass to chattels claim based on the plaintiffs’ act of
downloading software to their cell phones).
299. See Rozenshtein, supra note 34 (arguing that “[i]f the government required infected
individuals to download a location-broadcasting app on their phones—or, in an extreme case, to
wear a physical device, like a GPS bracelet—that would almost certainly trigger the Fourth
Amendment under Jones”).
300. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 403.
301. See id. at 404–05.
302. Id. at 410.
303. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (guaranteeing “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures”); Jones, 565 U.S.
at 407 n.3 (“Where . . . the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a
constitutionally protected area, such a [Fourth Amendment] search has undoubtedly occurred.”); id.
at 411 n.8 (stating that “[t]he Fourth Amendment protects against trespassory searches only with
regard to those items (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) that it enumerates” (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend. IV)); see also HON. GREGORY M. CASKEY, CAL. SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2:11 (2021)
(recognizing that “[a] physical intrusion of a person for the purpose of obtaining information or
evidence is a search” under Jones); Cunningham II, 997 N.E.2d 468, 471–72 (2013) (applying the
Jones physical trespass test in the employment context to find a “search” had occurred when a public
employer attached a GPS device to an employee’s vehicle and used the device to monitor the
vehicle’s movements).
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employees consent to the use of such wearables, however, which is the most
likely scenario, no such trespass would occur.304
3. Seizure of the Employee’s Person
Fourth Amendment claims may involve seizures of persons, which
occur when there has been “a meaningful interference with [the person’s]
freedom of movement.”305 In the criminal investigation context, seizures of
persons include arrests or de facto arrests,306 and less intrusive investigative
detentions known as “Terry-level” seizures.307 For any type of Fourth
Amendment seizure, the important point is that the individual’s freedom of
movement has been restrained.308 In the instant context, however, when an
employer utilizes a contact tracing device to track employee interactions (or
even their locations), the employer does not meaningfully restrain the
employees’ freedom of movement.309 Rather, employees can go about their
day as usual, with the contact tracing technology working in the background,
often completely unnoticed.310 As such, no seizure of the employees
themselves occurs.311
Of course, anytime a person is required to be in the workplace for a set
period of time, that person would not generally feel “free to leave” the
workplace during that window of time, perhaps suggesting that the

304. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 408–10 (distinguishing two prior Supreme Court opinions—United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)—on the basis
of consent); see also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438–39 (1963) (finding that no Fourth
Amendment “search” occurred under the physical trespass test when an undercover agent
consensually entered a criminal suspect’s premises with a tape recorder because the invited agent
was there “with petitioner’s consent” and was not a trespasser).
305. Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989). See generally United States
v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465, 1467–68 (10th Cir. 1996) (summarizing the types of Fourth Amendment
seizures).
306. See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 17–18 (1990) (involving an arrest); Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200, 206–16 (1979) (involving a detention later characterized as a de facto arrest,
even though the suspect was told he was not under arrest).
307. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968) (authorizing a brief, temporary seizure of a
person suspected of committing a crime on the basis of reasonable, articulable suspicion).
308. See id. at 19 n.16 (stating that “[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force or show
of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has
occurred”); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625 (1991) (applying the Terry definition of
“seizure”).
309. See Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989, 998 (2021) (recognizing that not “every physical
contact between a government employee and a member of the public [amounts to] a Fourth
Amendment seizure”; rather, “[a] seizure requires the use of force with intent to restrain”).
310. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
311. Cf. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 625–26 (holding that one type of seizure occurs when a criminal
suspect submits to an officer’s show of authority, thereby resulting in an actual restraint of the
suspect’s movement).
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individual’s freedom of movement is in fact restrained.312 While this may be
true, it is the fact of employment itself, coupled with the employer’s general
requirements specifying how and where the employee’s work must be
performed, that causes any such restraint.313 The employer’s contact tracing
technology does not.
Accordingly, it is doubtful that the mere
implementation of a contact tracing program would constitute a seizure of an
employee.
4. Seizure of the Employee’s Property
The alternative seizure question is whether a seizure of employee
property occurs when a contact tracing program is implemented. Under
Fourth Amendment precedent, a seizure of property occurs “when there is
some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in
that property.”314
When an employee agrees to utilize a wearable contact tracing device
provided by an employer, such as a smart necklace, there is no seizure of the
employee’s property.315 The device itself is owned by the employer, rather
than the employee, and the employee’s sole possessory interest in the device
is for contact tracing purposes in the manner defined by the employer, a
possessory interest that is not “interfered” with by the employer.316 Simply
put, because the employee’s possessory interest in the device is for contact
tracing purposes only, there is no meaningful interference with that
possessory interest when the device is used solely for that purpose.317
312. See I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984) (recognizing that “[o]rdinarily, when
people are at work their freedom to move about has been meaningfully restricted, not by the actions
of law enforcement officials, but by the workers’ voluntary obligations to their employers”); Carter
v. City of Milwaukee, 743 F.3d 540, 544 (7th Cir. 2014) (same); United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (stating that “a person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave”).
313. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218 (rejecting Fourth Amendment seizure claim brought by a
group of employees who were detained for a brief period of time for questioning).
314. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
315. Cf. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 711 (1984) (finding that no Fourth Amendment
“seizure” occurred when DEA agents placed a beeper inside a can of ether that at the time belonged
to the DEA); id. at 711–13 (rejecting the argument that a Fourth Amendment “seizure” occurred
when the can of ether was later transferred to the defendant).
316. See id.; cf. State v. Jean, 407 P.3d 524, 528 (Ariz. 2018) (rejecting seizure argument based
on warrantless GPS tracking of a truck because defendant himself, who was a passenger in the truck,
did not own the truck and never possessed the truck outside of the owner’s presence).
317. Cf. Tower v. City of Denton, No. 4:05CV302, 2007 WL 2900466, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sept.
28, 2007) (refusing to grant summary judgment for the employer and its agents when the plaintiffemployee alleged that his briefcase and a locked metal box in his desk were searched in violation
of the Fourth Amendment); O’Brien v. S. Suburban Coll., No. 93-C-7172, 1994 WL 376282, at *5
(N.D. Ill. July 15, 1994) (recognizing that an employee’s purse “generally contains private property
and personal items and effects, and generally is for the employee’s exclusive use”).
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Alternatively, when an employee downloads a contact tracing app to his
or her personal cell phone and enables the app to collect data of the phone’s
whereabouts, no seizure of the phone itself occurs.318 Indeed, in this
circumstance, there has been no meaningful interference with the employee’s
possessory interest in his or her device, as the employer has not exercised
control over the device while denying control to the employee.319 Rather, the
right to possess the device remains at all times with the employee, who
simply agrees to permit limited data collection by the employer through that
device in a way that does not interfere with the phone’s operation.320
Finally, no seizure of the employee’s location data would occur in the
context of contact tracing. First, unlike other types of seizable data such as
emails or text messages, employees do not have a meaningful possessory
interest in the record of who they came in close contact with at work, and
thus have no real ownership interest in that data that could be “seized.”321 In
addition, unlike GPS and CSLI data, contact tracing apps and wearables do
not generate detailed location information; rather, such technologies only
capture data that can be used to determine relative proximity to other devices,
and it makes little sense to talk about a possessory interest in that type of
data.322 Finally, when an employee enables a cell phone app to allow for
contact tracing data collection, the employer is not changing “the
predetermined path of [that data] by some intentional action,” as the data
itself did not exist before this action.323 Accordingly, it is unlikely that the
Fourth Amendment would be implicated in this manner.

318. See Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Seizures of Computer Data, 119 YALE L.J. 700, 705
(2010) (recognizing that “a seizure of physical property occurs when the government takes control
of the property and denies control to others”).
319. See id. at 711 (stating that “[i]n the case of movable property, property is seized when it is
taken away from the person who has lawful control over it”); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 113 (1984); cf. Krivolenkov v. Ferrer, No. 3:20-CV-00759-MO, 2020 WL 6152360, at *5 (D.
Or. Oct. 20, 2020) (finding police officer did not seize a suspect’s cell phone simply by the act of a
grabbing a suspect’s wrist, causing the suspect to drop his phone on the ground).
320. Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 419 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (suggesting that
a GPS device attached to a vehicle does not seize the vehicle under the Fourth Amendment because
the device does “not interfere in any way with the operation of the vehicle”).
321. Cf. Kerr, supra note 318, at 723–24 (discussing the interception of emails and the copying
of remotely stored files as Fourth Amendment “seizures”); see, e.g., Larios v. Lunardi, 445 F. Supp.
3d 778, 782 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (finding that employer’s act of copying the entire contents of an
employee’s cell phone constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure); In re Search of Info. Associated
with [Redacted]@mac.com, 13 F. Supp. 3d 145, 150 (D.D.C.) (declaring that “a seizure of property
occurs when e-mails are copied and taken by the government without the owner’s consent because
an individual’s ‘possessory interest [in the e-mails] extends to both the original and any copies made
from it’” (alteration in original) (quoting Kerr, supra note 318, at 703)), vacated by 13 F. Supp. 3d
157 (D.D.C. 2014).
322. See supra Section I.B.2 and I.C.
323. See Kerr, supra note 318, at 721.
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C. Step 2: Reasonableness of Contact Tracing Methods
As discussed in the previous Section, any Fourth Amendment challenge
to contact tracing conducted through cell phone apps or wearable devices
would likely fail at the first step of Fourth Amendment analysis.
Nevertheless, if employee consent to such surveillance is deemed coerced,
such a finding might trigger Fourth Amendment protection. Accordingly,
this Section assumes for the sake of analysis that the Fourth Amendment
would apply, and thus considers whether the O’Connor workplace exception
would permit such surveillance.324
Under O’Connor, a search or seizure must be both reasonable at its
inception and reasonable in scope.325 Importantly, however, the O’Connor
workplace exception does not authorize all work-related intrusions. Rather,
built into these standards is a requirement that the search be “work-related,”
or based on some legitimate employer interest.326 In addition, as O’Connor
notes, this exception applies only in the “workplace context,” making the
exception applicable only to “those areas and items that are related to work
and . . . generally within the employer’s control.”327 Accordingly, before
applying the O’Connor reasonableness framework, one must first ensure the
exception itself applies.
1. Applicability of O’Connor Workplace Exception
As noted, the O’Connor exception extends only to “those areas and
items that are related to work and . . . generally within the employer’s
control.”328 Certainly, wearable tracking devices provided by the employer
for the specific purpose of contact tracing within the workplace would
encompass “items” (the wearables) and “areas” (the workplace) generally

324. Notably, if the O’Connor exception does not apply, a court would presumably apply a
general Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis that balances the competing interests at stake.
See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385, 393–98 (2014) (“Absent more precise guidance from
the founding era, the Court generally determines whether to exempt a given type of search from the
warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.’” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
As discussed in Part IV, the same types of factors discussed in this Section remain relevant,
including: (1) a legitimate business purpose underlying the employer’s surveillance program; (2)
employee consent to the surveillance program; and (3) surveillance that is limited to the workplace
itself and does not capture data regarding off-duty movements. See Carniol v. N.Y.C. Taxi &
Limousine Comm’n, 975 N.Y.S.2d 842, 848–49 (Sup. Ct. 2013), aff’d, 2 N.Y.S.3d 337 (App. Div.
2015).
325. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987).
326. See, e.g., Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
327. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715.
328. See id.
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within the employer’s control.329 The more difficult question is whether
employees’ personal cell phones fall within the scope of this exception.
As cases like Port Authority recognize, employees’ personal cell phones
are not usually “items . . . related to work and . . . generally within the
employer’s control,” and hence may not be subject to the O’Connor
workplace exception.330 Nevertheless, to the extent those devices are
routinely used for a legitimate employment-related purpose—arguably
including contact tracing—the O’Connor exception might apply. A 2020
United States district court case involving an employer’s search of an
employee’s personal cell phone, Larios v. Lunardi,331 supports this result.332
The plaintiff in that case, Timothy Larios, worked as a California
Highway Patrol (“CHP”) officer and served on the Shasta Interagency
Narcotics Task Force (“SINTF”), where he often communicated with
confidential informants.333 SINTF policy declared that any CHP work
product produced on personal devices, including personal cell phones,
became the “property of the state and must be relinquished on demand.”334
During SINTF’s investigation of a suspected marijuana dealer named Nathan
Santana, Larios began a prohibited romantic relationship with a confidential
informant involved in the investigation, Tawnya Mellow.335 After Santana
discovered a greeting card on Mellow’s car from Larios that revealed his
romantic feelings for her, prompting a domestic incident, Larios’s employer
began investigating his relationship with Mellow.336 Investigators ordered
Larios to produce his personal cell phone so they could determine the nature
and extent of his interactions with Mellow.337 Investigators then created a
backup of Larios’s entire phone and extracted all relevant text messages from
that backup.338

329. See Quon, 560 U.S. at 760–62 (applying O’Connor to uphold an employer’s search of text
messages on an employer-issued pager); Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 1994)
(finding no Fourth Amendment violation in the search of a judicial clerk’s office, desk, and file
cabinets, because clerk could not reasonably expect privacy in those areas).
330. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715; see also supra notes 235–241 and accompanying text.
331. 442 F. Supp. 3d 1299 (E.D. Cal.), determined by 445 F. Supp. 3d 778 (E.D. Cal. 2020),
aff’d, 856 F. App’x 704 (9th Cir. 2021).
332. See Larios, 445 F. Supp. 3d 778 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (analyzing the Fourth Amendment seizure
issue); Larios, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1299 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (analyzing the Fourth Amendment search
issue).
333. Larios, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 1302.
334. Id. at 1303 (quotation omitted). Larios received and reviewed this policy when he was a
SINTF agent. Id.
335. Id. at 1302–03.
336. Id. at 1303.
337. Id. at 1304.
338. Id.
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Larios later sued under the Fourth Amendment, alleging that the CHP
Commissioner and officers involved in the search conducted an unlawful
seizure when they downloaded the contents of his personal cell phone and an
unlawful search when they inspected those contents.339 On the search issue,
the court noted that the Larios defendants had conducted an employee
misconduct investigation in their capacity as supervisors, rather than a
criminal investigation, with the goal of uncovering text messages that CHP
considered “work product” under its governing policy.340 Accordingly, the
court determined that the O’Connor exception applied.341
Applying O’Connor’s two-part reasonableness test, the court first found
that the defendants’ “inspection of CHP work product” within Larios’s phone
was justified at its inception given that Larios had “inexplicably left a
romantic greeting card at the residence of a confidential informant and the
target of a criminal investigation,” which jeopardized the case against
Santana.342 In searching Larios’s text messages, CHP simply “sought to
understand the scope of [Larios]’s communication with Mellow and mitigate
harm that might flow from his potential misconduct,” making the search
reasonable at the outset.343
Regarding the scope of search, the court found that the “limited search
of [Larios]’s texts with Mellow was reasonably related to the objectives of
the investigation and not excessively intrusive given the grave abuse of
power suspected.”344 The court emphasized that the defendants appropriately
restricted their search to Larios’s texts with Mellow, and even further “to a
subset of [those] messages . . . from September 1, 2013 (the month Mellow
initially contacted SINTF with information about Santana) to November 5,
2014 (the day before CHP directed [Larios] to produce his phone),” making
the search reasonable in scope.345
The search conducted in Larios was done pursuant to an employer
policy that made work product produced on personal devices the property of
the employer that must be relinquished on demand.346 This policy, in turn,

339. Id. at 1302.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 1309–10.
342. Id. at 1310.
343. Id.
344. Id. Although the court later found the defendants’ seizure of the phone’s entire contents
separately unreasonable, see Larios v. Lunardi, 445 F. Supp. 3d 778, 785 (E.D. Cal. 2020), aff’d,
856 F. App’x 704 (9th Cir. 2021), the case is nevertheless significant in demonstrating how a
properly limited search of a personal cell phone may fall within the parameters of the O’Connor
exception.
345. Larios v. Lunardi, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1299, 1310 (E.D. Cal.), determined by 445 F. Supp. 3d
778 (E.D. Cal. 2020), aff’d, 856 F. App’x 704 (9th Cir. 2021).
346. Id. at 1303.
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made these particular cell phone contents “related to work and . . . generally
within the employer’s control” under O’Connor.347 By analogy, the data
produced by a contact tracing app installed on an employee’s cell phone
could be lawfully inspected by the employer under the O’Connor workplace
exception, especially when, as in Larios, the employee is aware that the data
is subject to inspection by the employer. Moreover, with many contact
tracing technologies, the tracing data itself always remains within the
employer’s control and, unlike Larios, need not be extracted from other
private data contained within an employee’s device.348
2. What Makes Contact Tracing Reasonable at the Outset
Assuming the O’Connor workplace exception applies, the first question
under that exception is whether an employer’s contact tracing program is
reasonable at its inception.349 According to O’Connor, a search by an
employer will be reasonable at its inception when the employer has
“reasonable grounds for suspecting” either “[(a)] that the search will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or [(b)] that
the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose.”350
Because workplace-wide contact tracing would not ordinarily take place in
the context of a misconduct investigation, an employer’s contact tracing
program must instead be necessary for a “noninvestigatory work-related
purpose.”351
Under this aspect of O’Connor, an employer should first ensure that its
contact tracing program is necessary for a “noninvestigatory work-related
purpose.”352 Stated differently, the employer must ensure that a legitimate
business objective justifies such data-collection and surveillance.353 As noted
in the Introduction, many American employers have a legal obligation to
provide a work environment “free from recognized hazards that are causing

347. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987).
348. See Larios v. Lunardi, 445 F. Supp. 3d 778, 785 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (rejecting the O’Connor
exception as justification for seizing all data within an employee’s cell phone, including both work
product and personal data, as “[t]he volume of data . . . seized was vastly disproportionate to the
amount of work product . . . on [the] phone”), aff’d, 856 F. App’x 704 (9th Cir. 2021).
349. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726.
350. Id. (emphasis added).
351. Id. (emphasis added).
352. Id. (emphasis added); see, e.g., Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 761 (2010) (holding a City
employer’s search of employee text messages reasonable at its inception because the City had
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search was necessary to determine whether the character
limit on its contract with Arch Wireless was sufficient).
353. See id. (holding that the City “had a legitimate interest in ensuring that employees were not
being forced to pay out of their own pockets for work-related expenses, or on the other hand that
the City was not paying for extensive personal communications”).
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or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm.”354 According to
OSHA, COVID-19 falls within the scope of this law, and requires employers
to take affirmative steps to reduce COVID-19 related hazards in the
workplace.355 Even for those employers not subject to the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, which includes various public employers,356 an
employer’s goal of minimizing COVID-19 infections amongst its workforce
is most assuredly a legitimate business objective, particularly during a time
when the virus is spreading or infection rates are high.357 As Carniol
recognized, ensuring the safety and well-being of employees and customers
is a legitimate business purpose or “substantial” governmental interest.358 If
this is true of the taxi industry, it is certainly true for employers wishing to
protect the lives of employees and maintain efficient business operations in
a pandemic-stricken economy.359 And as in Carniol, where the employer
implemented GPS tracking to accomplish its legitimate business objective,
the use of contact tracing technology is an efficient way of accomplishing
these noninvestigatory objectives.360
Under a general Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis, courts
would ordinarily balance the degree to which the employer’s intrusion is
needed for the promotion of legitimate employer interests against the degree
to which it invades employee privacy.361 For contact tracing accomplished
through cell phone apps and wearable devices provided by an employer, the
degree of intrusion upon employee privacy is minimal. The PwC contact
tracing app, for example, simply runs in the background and uses Bluetooth
and Wi-Fi data to determine employees’ proximity to one another and the
amount of time employees spend interacting.362 The app does not track

354. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a); see also Hoffman & Litchfield, supra note 1.
355. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 2, at 8–16 ; see also Hoffman
& Litchfield, supra note 1.
356. See supra note 1.
357. See Carlie Porterfield, Coronavirus Has Killed More Americans than Any Flu in Half a
Century,
FORBES
(Apr.
30,
2020,
12:17
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/carlieporterfield/2020/04/30/coronavirus-has-killed-moreamericans-than-any-flu-in-half-a-century/?sh=46a9b9aa3d3c (reporting on the dangers of COVID19).
358. See supra note 204 (discussing Carniol).
359. See generally O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987) (recognizing that “[t]he
governmental interest justifying work-related intrusions by public employers is the efficient and
proper operation of the workplace”).
360. See Ramjee et al., supra note 21, at 103 (recognizing that “digital surveillance tools provide
a potential opportunity to supplement existing contact tracing initiatives by facilitating the fast
identification of known and unknown contacts”).
361. See supra note 119.
362. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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anyone’s location or analyze data outside of work, making it less invasive
than the type of round-the-clock surveillance conducted in Cunningham.363
Although such app-based contact tracing technologies are relatively
unintrusive, obtaining employee consent for such surveillance will help
ensure that an employer’s program of contact tracing remains reasonable at
the outset.364 After all, if an employee understands that their movements and
interactions at work will be monitored, a reasonable employee would be
aware that sound management principles might require review of that data.365
Accordingly, although employee consent is not categorically required by the
Fourth Amendment, obtaining valid employee consent to the employer’s
program of contact tracing would tilt the reasonableness balancing even
further in the employer’s direction.366
3. Permissible Scope of Contact Tracing and Least Invasive Tracing
Techniques
According to O’Connor, a search will be reasonable in scope when “the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and
not excessively intrusive.”367 Under this standard, the underlying business
justification for the search delineates its permissible scope.368 With that
underlying business justification in mind, an employer should collect the
minimal information necessary to achieve its objective.369
When an employer implements a system of contact tracing in the
workplace, the employer’s core objective is to protect the health and safety
of employees and other individuals in the workplace by identifying potential
virus exposures in an efficient and cost-effective manner.370 Although roundthe-clock contact tracing is obviously more likely to identify every potential
exposure to the COVID-19 virus, employers must be careful not to engage in
surveillance that a court might find excessively intrusive.371 And as a
comparison between Carniol and Cunningham shows, surveillance that is
363. Putzier & Cutter, supra note 3; Combs, supra note 50.
364. See Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 762 (2010); cf. Carniol v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine
Comm’n, 975 N.Y.S.2d 842, 849 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (discussing the role of employee consent under
the reasonableness prong of Fourth Amendment analysis), aff’d, 2 N.Y.S.3d 337 (N.Y. App. Div.
2015).
365. See Quon, 560 U.S. at 762 (making a similar point).
366. See supra note 133.
367. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 342 (1985)).
368. See supra notes 159–163 and accompanying text.
369. See Quon, 560 U.S. at 761–63 (discussing the employer’s limited scope of search); Larios
v. Lunardi, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1299 (E.D. Cal.) (same), determined by 445 F. Supp. 3d 778 (E.D. Cal.
2020), aff’d, 856 F. App’x 704 (9th Cir. 2021).
370. See supra note 3.
371. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726.
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limited to the workplace itself and does not capture information regarding
employees’ off-duty whereabouts is far more likely to be upheld as
reasonable.372 Indeed, Cunningham determined that “[w]here an employer
conducts a GPS search without making a reasonable effort to avoid tracking
an employee outside of business hours, the search as a whole must be
considered unreasonable.”373 Accordingly, the least invasive contact tracing
technologies are those that are limited in geographic scope to the workplace
itself and limited in temporal scope to working hours.374 The contact tracing
cell phone apps and wearable devices discussed in Part I satisfy these
standards.375
V. PROPOSALS AND UNDERLYING CONCERNS
Both app-based contact tracing and contact tracing accomplished by
wearable devices are typically carried out for the noninvestigatory, workrelated purpose of minimizing COVID-19 infections and ensuring the safety
and well-being of employees and others in the workplace. In O’Connor, the
Supreme Court declared that public employers should be afforded “wide
latitude” to conduct such searches in order “[t]o ensure the efficient and
proper operation of the agency.”376
Despite the “wide latitude” afforded employers, relevant Fourth
Amendment precedents reveal that employers should avoid engaging in
excessively intrusive surveillance.377 Accordingly, employers should opt for
the contact tracing technologies that collect the minimal information
necessary to accomplish the relevant employment objective.378 This includes
collecting data that is limited to the workplace itself, that does not encompass
non-working hours, and that is anonymized to the maximum extent
possible.379 To ensure that any contact tracing program passes muster under
the Fourth Amendment, employers should also notify employees of their
contact tracing plans, obtain employee consent, and avoid a blanket rule
372. See supra Part III.
373. Cunningham II, 997 N.E.2d 468, 473 (2013).
374. This is generally true of the technologies discussed in Section I.B.2. and Section I.C.—i.e.,
contact tracing using cell phone Bluetooth data, and contact tracing accomplished through wearable
location monitoring devices. See Barnes et al., supra note 9 (arguing that employers wishing to
implement contact tracing apps should avoid gathering data from employees while off duty).
375. See supra text accompanying notes 361–363.
376. 480 U.S. at 723.
377. See id. at 723, 726; Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 761–63 (discussing the limited scope
of the challenged search).
378. See id. at 723, 726; Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 761–63 (discussing the limited scope
of the challenged search); see also Ramjee et al., supra note 21, at 105–06 (arguing that digital
contact tracing tools should establish data collection and processing at a scale that is limited to what
is minimally necessary for achieving specific public health objectives).
379. See Barnes et al., supra note 9.
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requiring all employees to participate in contact tracing in order to alleviate
any concerns over potentially coerced consent.380
Although the contact tracing apps and wearable contact tracing devices
discussed in Sections I.B.2 and I.C would likely not violate the Fourth
Amendment for the reasons outlined in the previous Part, the potential of
certain contact tracing technologies to cast a wide net of surveillance requires
careful analysis regarding whether certain tracing technologies could be
deemed unreasonable on the whole.381 In recent Fourth Amendment cases,
the United States Supreme Court has recognized that individuals may
reasonably expect privacy in the whole of their physical movements.382
Because of this, the Supreme Court has deemed the warrantless, round-theclock surveillance of a criminal suspect’s movements unreasonable.383
Lower courts have ruled the same.384
Beyond the criminal context, recent precedents reveal a Court
concerned with the long-term, unrestrained tracking of ordinary law-abiding
citizens with no suspicion of wrongdoing.385 In striking down the warrantless
gathering of over one hundred days of a suspect’s CSLI in Carpenter, for
example, the Supreme Court emphasized that the data at issue “provide[d] a

380. See id. (identifying these variables).
381. See Ramjee et al., supra note 21, at 126–27 (noting the possibility of “mission creep” where
governments could extend the use of contact tracing apps beyond their intended purpose of disease
control to enforce travel restrictions and quarantine orders, including imposition of fines and
potential criminal charges (quoting Matthew Guariglia, The Dangers of COVID-19 Surveillance
Proposals to the Future of Protest, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 29, 2020),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/04/some-covid-19-surveillance-proposals-could-harm-freespeech-after-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/PN7Y-JUSH])). Along these lines, Minnesota Law
Professor Alan Z. Rozenshtein has argued that “[i]f . . . the government were to collect large
amounts of location data from companies (in order to do contact tracing), that would likely trigger
the Fourth Amendment under the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test.” Rozenshtein, supra
note 34.
382. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
383. In Jones, the Court unanimously struck down one instance of GPS tracking in which a
suspect’s vehicle was monitored on public streets for nearly a month. The Court held that “the
Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor
the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a [Fourth Amendment] ‘search,’” thereby presumptively
requiring a warrant. 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 430–31 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (concluding on behalf of Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan that the lengthy
GPS monitoring that occurred in that case constituted a Fourth Amendment “search,” thereby
presumptively requiring a warrant); id. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
384. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 903 N.W.2d 101, 113–14 (S.D. 2017) (ruling that the warrantless,
long-term video recording of all activity outside a criminal suspect’s home violated the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Senese, No. 18-CR-60076-BB, 2018 WL 3159733, at *7 (S.D. Fla.
June 28, 2018) (finding that “[t]he warrantless placement and use of the GPS tracker on [a criminal
suspect]’s vessel for 28 days . . . was an unreasonable search”), aff’d, 798 F. App’x 499 (11th Cir.
2020).
385. See McAllister, supra note 18 (discussing how Jones impacts employers).
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comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements,”386 and noted that the
“[m]uch like GPS tracking of a vehicle, cell phone location information is
detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.”387 In light of these
concerns, employers should avoid the more robust forms of contact tracing
carried out through cell phone GPS,388 or through other potentially more
robust forms of location monitoring.389
CONCLUSION
At first blush, the idea of having one’s movements traced at all times
while at work, even for the noble cause of protecting the health and safety of
others, might seem overly intrusive. Yet, for public employers, this Article
has shown that the Fourth Amendment is likely not violated by the most
common forms of contact tracing in use today, including cell phone appbased contact tracing technologies that rely on Bluetooth or Wi-Fi and
wearable contact tracing devices that rely on similar technologies to
determine workers’ proximities to one another.
Nevertheless, the lessons learned from cases involving GPS tracking by
employers tell a cautionary tale. Those cases reveal that when an employer
considers implementing a program of contact tracing, the employer should
opt for a contact tracing technology that collects the minimal information
necessary to accomplish the employer’s objective. This includes collecting
data that is limited to the workplace itself, that does not encompass nonworking hours, and that is anonymized to the maximum extent possible. As
a best practice, the employer should also provide notice of the employer’s
contact tracing plans and obtain employee consent to such tracing without
imposing a blanket rule requiring employee consent to alleviate any coercionbased concerns.

386.
387.
388.
389.

138 S. Ct. at 2211.
Id. at 2216.
See supra Section I.B.1.
See supra Section I.E.

